DARFUR IN PERSPECTIVE
By Professor David Hoile
Published by The European - Sudanese Public Affairs Council
Chapter 5
THE JANJAWEED IN DARFUR
Comprehensive, forcible disarmament is hazardous at best, impossible at worst. Before effective disarmament (or more realistically, regulation of armaments) can take place, a workable definition of the Janjawiid is needed.
The Justice Africa human rights organisation [441]
In Darfur, Janjaweed is a word that means everything and nothing.
The Reuters Sudan Correspondent [442]
One of the biggest problems facing any analysis of the Darfur conflict,
and subsequently any attempt to resolve it, is the extent to which the
international community, responding to a combination of poor analysis,
shallow media reporting or, in some instances, straightforward
propaganda projections of one sort or another, has reduced the crisis to
one or two images and demands. The “Janjaweed” phenomena is one
such image and with it comes a demand, that the government of Sudan
immediately stop all Janjaweed activity and disarm these people. The simple fact is that no-one has arrived at an objective definition of
the term “Janjaweed”.
It has seemingly been used as a blanket term to
describe any armed nomadic tribesman in Darfur today, and particularly
anyone involved in attacks on “African” communities in the region. The
United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur adopted
a typically questionable definition of “Janjaweed”. It noted that there
were two “precisions” in a definition of “Janjaweed”, that attackers were
Arab and armed with modern weapons. The Commission further noted
that outside of these “precisions” it is “probably impossible to define the ‘Janjaweed’”. The Commission also stated that “where victims describe
their attackers as Janjaweed, these persons might be from a tribal Arab militia, from the PDF or from some other entity...” [443] It is clear that the
Commission, by its own admission, followed a muddled and subjective
rather than an objective definition of what constituted “Janjaweed”.
The difficulties in coming to a definition of “Janjaweed” have been
addressed by other UN observers. The UN media service has described
the “Janjaweed” as being made up of “Sudanese and Chadian horse and
camel-riding Arab nomads, opportunists and ‘criminals’”. [444] The team
leader for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in
North Darfur, Niels Scott, commented in November 2004: “The
Janjaweed takes many different forms. It could be a local tribal issue, or
it could be plain banditry. Or it could be plain banditry. It could be
profiteering…This Janjaweed business – I shy away a bit from it.
Janjaweed – as an historical concept – has been around for years. What
we are seeing now is…criminality.” Asked if the lawlessness was being
directed from Khartoum, Niels Scott said “There’s no direction”. [445]
There can be no simple reading of the issue. [446] The difficulty in
adequately defining the term has been seen as a problem by Human
Rights Watch. In its publication Empty Promises? Continuing Abuses
in Darfur, Sudan, it observed:
[I]t is increasingly clear that the term ‘Janjaweed,’ while used by
victims to describe any armed attacker, is in fact a misnomer, and that
are at least two types of forces encompassed by the description: 1) the
government-backed militias used as proxy forces in the government’s
military campaign; and 2) opportunistic armed elements taking advantage of the total collapse of law and order to settle scores, loot and raid cattle and livestock. [447]
Darfur is an ecologically fragile area and had already been subject to
growing – and often armed – conflict over access to water and pastures.
The war has greatly exacerbated previously-existing tensions. In perhaps
the most objective reading of the crisis in Darfur, the UN media service
observed: “The conflict pits farming communities against nomads who
have aligned themselves with the militia groups – for whom the raids are
a way of life – in stiff competition for land and resources. The militias,
known as the Janjaweed, attack in large numbers on horseback and
camels and are driving the farmers from their land, often pushing them
towards town centres.” [448] There is also no doubt that these militias, and
criminal gangs, have exploited the security gap which opened up in
Darfur following the murder by rebels of over 685 policemen and the
destruction of dozens of police stations in a region the size of France or
California in which law enforcement infrastructure was already badly
stretched.
The scale of the violence in Darfur, even before the outbreak of
rebellion in 2003, had led to Khartoum introducing special measures,
including the declaration of a state of emergency [449] and the
establishment by presidential decree of eight special criminal courts to
deal with offences such as murder, tribal clashes, armed robbery, arson
and the smuggling of weapons.
The UN media service has reported “that there was nothing new about
tribal clashes between nomads of Arabic extraction and village farmers
belonging to local African tribes in Darfur, but these days they have
become much more deadly because the raiders were better armed.” A
foreign diplomat noted: “The Janjawid have kept their traditional values
and ways of living. They do the same as they used to: they steal to get.
Only this time, their weapons are more sophisticated.” [450]
It has also become apparent that the Darfur issue has been caught up in
the sort of propaganda and misinformation that has characterised
previous coverage of Sudan. Several commentators appear to have opted
for a partisan or lazy analysis of events in Darfur, seemingly unable to
resist projecting the image of government-supported “Arab” –
“Janjaweed” – militias attacking “African” villagers (and in doing so
often merely echoing questionable rebel claims).
The Sudanese authorities have repeatedly and consistently denied that
they are sponsoring “Janjaweed” gunmen in Darfur. Sudanese leaders
from the President and ministers downwards have described
“Janjaweed” gunmen as “outlaws”. [451] The Sudanese foreign minister, Dr
Mustapha Osman Ismail, has noted: “The problem is the word
Janjaweed has become a coverall for so many things. There are militias
that are outside the rule of law, and this is one of the things we are going
to crack down on.” [452] Simplistic readings of events in Darfur claim that
Khartoum is in control of all those groups labelled as “Janjaweed” - this
despite increasing evidence that these forces are out of control. [453]
Assertions that the government controls the “Janjaweed” – and that it
can turn their activities off and on like a tap – have distorted the reality
of events. Human rights groups, for example, have confirmed Janjaweed
attacks on policemen and police stations. Human Rights Watch
researcher Julie Flint, for example, has also reported on a Janjaweed
attack on the police station at Terbeba. She does not mention what
happened to the policemen inside, but states the police station was
burned down. [454] Amnesty International has noted the fact that policemen
are often targeted for attack by Janjaweed gangs. [455] The UN Commission of Inquiry on Darfur noted examples of Janjaweed
attacks on police, reporting, for example, that victims of attacks stated
that “the police were indeed targeted during the attacks on the villages”
and that they “mainly blamed the Janjaweed for these actions”. [456] The
Commission reported that there have been instances where Janjaweed
gunmen have attacked and killed policemen defending villagers from
Janjaweed attack. It recorded, for example, that Janjaweed raiders killed
17 policemen in an attack on Kailek, in South Darfur. [457]
One clear example, amongst many, of a “Janjaweed” attack and a
government response, was that involving an attack by between 800 and
1,000 heavily armed members of a nomadic group that attacked the
Shattayia area in North Darfur on 10 February 2004. This attack was
against a Fur community and was in revenge for the killing of two
members of the nomadic Salamat tribe and one member of the Beni
Halba tribe by members of the Fur tribe. Government forces responded
to this inter-tribal attack and engaged the nomadic attackers. Eleven
policemen and six members of the Popular Defence Force were killed in
the engagement. A large number of “Janjaweed” raiders were killed in
the action. In another engagement, on 4 February 2004, Sudanese armed
forces, including air force units, responded to an attack by nomadic
tribes on Zaghawa and Massaleit communities east and north of Nyala.
Seven hundred and fifty head of livestock were recovered by
Government forces from these “Janjaweed” raiders. [458] “Janjaweed”
gangs are also reported to have attacked Arab tribes. [459]
The UN Commission provided a clear example of the scale and violence
of some ad hoc inter-tribal revenge attacks pre-dating the 2003
rebellion. It documented the case known as Jagre al-Hadi al Makbul
and others, which involved the Rezeigat and the Ma’aliyah tribes, both Arab, and related to events in April and May 2002. One member of the
Rezeigat tribe was killed by two members of the Ma’aliyah tribe. On 18
May 2002, 40 days after the incident, 700-800 Rezeigat tribesmen,
dressed in military uniforms and heavily armed, attacked a Ma’aliyah
community, killing 54, wounding another 24, burning the settlement and
looting cattle and household property. The Commission noted that
Government forces were not involved. [460] There have been countless
instances of the sort of violence described above since early 2003 and in
the wake of the dislocation of law and order. Inter-tribal revenge and
opportunistic raids have led to a spiral of similar attacks and counterattacks
well outside of the control of the government.
A May 2004 United Nations media report stated that diplomats and
Chadian government officials “question how much control Khartoum
has over these nomadic horsemen”. [461] That the militiamen that have
come to be known as “Janjaweed” are out of control is clear. Many of
these gunmen have on several occasions attacked civilians in Chad. [462]
That Sudan would have had very little to gain from attacks on Chad is
clear. Chad is a mediator in the Darfur conflict. Chadian President Déby
has in fact been accused of being sympathetic towards Khartoum,
having, for example, previously committed several hundred Chadian
soldiers to joint operations with the Sudanese army. [463] Ahmad Allami,
President Idriss Déby’s official spokesman, stated: “Now, there is the
feeling that Sudan does not have control over the militia and needs
assistance.” [464] Chad’s acting Defence Minister, Emmanuel Nadingar,
announced that, on 5 May 2004, the Chadian army clashed with a
raiding party of Janjaweed 25 kilometres inside Chadian territory andkilled 60 of them. One Chadian soldier was killed and seven others were
wounded in the battle. The UN report stated that “One captured
Janjaweed fighter who was presented to the press in Chad this week
confirmed fears that the militia were operating on their own initiative
without necessarily following orders from Khartoum.” The gunman
stated: “Nobody sent us to Chad.” [465] The idea that the Khartoum
authorities would have directed militiamen under its control to attack
Chadian civilians and President Déby’s forces would make no sense -
and clearly demonstrates the anarchy associated with those groups
labelled as “Janjaweed”.
The Khartoum authorities have taken several steps to end abuses in
Darfur. In June 2004, the Sudanese President ordered security forces to
disarm all groups, including rebels and pro-government militia, in the
conflict-ridden region of Darfur: “What happened in Darfur is bloody
and severe for all Sudanese people, not only the Darfurians.” [466] The
Sudanese President announced a few days later that both Sudan and
Chad had agreed to cooperate in the disarming of militias on both sides
of their border: “We have completed an agreement with Chad to collect
arms in Darfur and the Chadian lands neighbouring Darfur at the same
time…To disarm the groups in one area without the other would not
help in resolving the problem.” [467] Khartoum’s commitment to crack
down on armed groups and gunmen in Darfur has been repeated on
several occasions, including during the visit to Sudan by American
Secretary of State Colin Powell. [468]
The Reuters correspondent in Sudan, Nima el-Baghir, has outlined the
difficulties in defining the term “Janjaweed”: “In Darfur, Janjaweed is a
word that means everything and nothing. It is a composite word deriving
literally from jinn – which in Arabic means devils or spirits, carrying G- 3 rifles on a jowad (horse).” [469] Her conclusion has also been echoed by
other journalists. The Los Angeles Times, for example, has noted that
“[t]he word ‘janjaweed’ means different things to different people. The
term, traditionally used to refer to bandits and criminals, is a
combination of Arabic words that convey the idea of evil gunmen on
horseback.”
In her article Ms el-Baghir interviewed an Arab tribal leader and asked
him if he would call himself a Janjaweed leader.
He responds furiously: ‘What is this word “militia”? What are
“Janjaweed”? These words mean nothing.’ For years, he says, his
people have defended themselves without government help. ‘Would
you entrust those you are responsible for, your women and children,
to a government which is so far away?’ He pauses as the voices of his
men chorus around him in agreement. ‘When they came to us and
said we will give you weapons to fight against the rebels, we said:
keep your weapons. Let us use our own.’ Abdullah falls quiet, while
some of the men with him proudly show me their guns. One says,
‘The government rifles were old but ours are from abroad and they are better. We bought them from Zagawa traders.’
In a different interview, Musa Hilal, a Darfurian tribal leader accused of
being a Janjaweed leader, also addressed the use of the term. “Janjaweed
means nothing, but it is a word used to encompass all evil, a convenient
way for Americans to understand who are the good guys and who are
the bad. When the rebellion began last year, the government approached
us and armed us. My sons were armed by the government and joined the
Border Intelligence. Some tribesmen joined the Popular Defense Force.”
[470] He has also pointed to the vagueness of the term: “The rebels spread
the word Janjaweed as if it were an organisation. As a political group
there is no specific concept called Janjaweed…It means nothing, but has
been used to mean everything.” Hilal explained his tribe’s involvement
in the fighting as an inter-tribal conflict. He stated that his clan had
suffered from “acts of banditry”, including the murder of young men andlivestock theft, carried out by the neighbouring Zaghawa tribe. The
Zaghawa and Fur then entered into an alliance against Arab tribes.
Human Rights Groups and the UN have confirmed that there was tit-fortat
violence in the lead up to the rebellion. [471] There is no doubt that Hilal
is the leader of paramilitary forces raised by the government in response
to the rebellion, forces separate from those groups of criminal
opportunists that have increased their activities since the destruction of
the police force in 2003. That some of these organised paramilitaries
have been involved in questionable activities is clear. Their activities
must be divorced from the other essentially criminal activities which
have gone on in Darfur since before the rebellion and which have
escalated since. One can only hope that the government is able to control
the sorts of forces seemingly commanded by people like Hilal. He has
stated his view with regard to disarmament: “As far as we as a tribe are concerned, whenever we feel the situation is completely secure and the
ceasefire is being respected, we will hand in our weapons. The reality is
that this is a country where everyone has weapons.” [472]
One Janjaweed leader, interviewed by the London Sunday Times,
denied any alignment with the government: “We are not with the rebels,
we are not with the government…we look for our due…We fight all
governments in Sudan. We get nothing from the government.” When
asked about possible international intervention by the UN, the USA or
Britain, the Janjaweed stated: “We will fight them. We hate them and we
will attack the foreigners. We refuse to be like Iraq – surrendered,
confused and occupied. We will fight them more than the mujaheddin in
Afghanistan.” [473] The Sunday Times also outlined some of the
difficulties facing the government: “Disarming these warring factions
may be impossible. If Khartoum dispatches more troops to Darfur, it will
be in violation of its ceasefire with the two main rebel groups.
Disarmament would in any case enrage the Janjaweed and the African and Arab tribal militias, who may turn their guns on aid workers and
Sudanese soldiers alike, detonating any chance of relief efforts.” [474]
A largely sensationalist, and on occasion disingenuous, media has
lumped together as “Janjaweed” regular army forces, popular defence
forces, police units, tribal militias, vigilantes and armed robbers through
to any armed “Arab” tribesman. It is a bit like claiming that the British
government controls not only all army and army reserve units and police
and police reserve units in Northern Ireland but is also controls and is
also responsible for all anti-republican or anti-Catholic loyalist
organisations, paramilitaries, gunmen and criminal rackets in the
province. The simple fact is that virtually all of Darfur’s 80 tribes and
groups will have members who are armed, some with members on both
sides of the conflict. Some tribal militias will not disarm unless rival
tribes also do so. A western diplomat in Khartoum has noted: “There are
many gangs or groups that (the Sudanese government) doesn’t control or
who may be partly under their control or controlled by the local
authorities. So this is not a clear-cut picture. That makes you understand
how difficult (disarmament) is logistically.” [475] According to the United
Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr Jan
Egeland “There are many armed groups and many armed criminal gangs
in Darfur.” He referred to the Janjaweed as “a monster that nobody
seems to be able to control”. [476] In early November 2004, the UN Envoy
to Sudan also observed: “The government does not control its own
forces fully. It co-opted paramilitary forces and now cannot count on
their obedience…The border lines between the military, the paramilitary
and the police are being blurred.” (477) Mr Pronk returned to this theme in
his February 2005 comments before the United Nations Security
Council: “The militias are strong and well organized. And there seems to
be a sort of an invisible hand behind their actions. There are forces in the back in Sudan, not inside the Government, yet powerful, that have the
capacity to spread terror on the ground…” [478]
Additionally, in any instance, there are a number of Arab tribes in
Darfur who are not in any way involved in the conflict. Seeking to
disarm those tribes could itself result in considerable armed conflict with
the central government.
The human rights group Justice Africa has addressed the need for a
sustainable definition of “Janjaweed”:
Who are the Janjawiid? A clear definition of the Janjawiid is a
requirement for their disarmament. The term ‘Janjawiid’ has been
used to denote Arab militias since the late 1980s, but not always to
refer to the same entities. Noting the term ‘Arab’ is ambiguous and
fluid in Darfur, we can note the following different armed Arab
groups in the region: Armed pastoralists. Every community in Darfur
is armed. For pastoralist groups, disarmament is out of the question as
long as there is no effective law enforcement…The Rizeigat (Abbala)
Janjawiid…The Beni Halba Fursan…Other Baggara militia, such as
the Janjawiid drawn from the Terjam group that lives in the environs
of Nyala. Chadian Arabs, including the Salamat group, which lives on
both sides of the Chad-Sudan border. Their numbers are unknown but
are rumoured to be substantial…The Rizeigat (Baggara)
Murahalin…Emergent militias among groups that have not thus far
been involved in the conflict…The Popular Defence Forces… [479]
Those who attribute every single act of violence or criminality to the
“Janjaweed” and claim that all these acts are on the instructions of the
Sudanese government are either naïve or are seeking to deliberately
mislead the international community. In either instance they ill serve the
people of Darfur. It is essential to cut away the propaganda that is
already clouding the Darfur issue. That Khartoum must address the
criminality and armed banditry that has undermined law and order in
Darfur is obvious. At the same time, however, lazy commentators and human rights organisations cannot have it both ways in criticising the
Sudanese government for inaction and then attacking Khartoum for
responding firmly to terrorism and lawlessness.
Claims That All Militias in Darfur can be Disarmed in 30 Days
Unrealistic expectations, often based upon naïve claims, have not
assisted with a resolution of the problem. One issue has been the
problem of disarming the many armed groups and individuals in Darfur.
In July 2004, for example, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
1556 threatening action against Sudan if it did not disarm gunmen in
Darfur within 30 days. [480] Charles Snyder, a former United States acting
assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, and the US State
Department’s senior representative on Sudan, has stated, however, that
there are no “30-day, 90-day quick fixes” to the problem. He also
admitted: “This is going to take, in my view, 18 months to two years to
conclude the first phase” of making the region safe for people to return
to their homes. [481] De Waal has also warned of international naivety with
regard to “disarming” the Janjaweed:
On July 30, the UN Security Council gave Khartoum 30 days to
disarm the Janjawid. But how? There are many different militia
groups, ranging from entire nomadic clans that have armed
themselves to protect their herds, to brigades of trained fighters
headed by Musa Hilal and some of his Chadian Arab comrades in
arms. The Janjawid paramilitaries are the direct responsibility of
Khartoum and can be demobilized, but the armed nomads will be
more difficult. In a region where every community has armed itself,
confiscating all arms is frankly impossible: what can be done is community-based regulated of arms, gradually marginalizing criminal elements through a process of political reconstruction. [482]
The international community appears to have realised the problems
inherent in the 30-day “fix-all” demands. As much was noted by the UN
Secretary-General in a report on 30 August 2004: “Making an area the
size of Darfur, with the amount of armed men and violent recent history,
safe and secure for all civilians takes more than 30 days.” [483] The
government committed itself to three steps: ending all offensive military
operations; identifying parts of Darfur that could be made safe within 30
days; and identifying those militias over whom it had control and
instructing them to lay down their weapons. The UN reported that the
government had, nonetheless, started a process of disarming those
militias that were under its command. [484] Janjaweed members have been
both arrested and convicted. [485] Four hundred had been arrested by
July. [486]
Justice Africa, the human rights organisation, has outlined realistic
measures that can be undertaken with regard to disarmament:
The most realistic option is twofold. On the one hand, [the
government] can control the paramilitary forces it has established
under the command of Musa Hilal and other commanders. Secondly,
it can initiate a process of arms regulation, whereby communities are
permitted to hold arms for legitimate self-defence, in accordance with
norms and procedures agreed by all groups, and they themselves
become partners in disarming the illegitimately armed groups. This
kind of disarmament will be gradual, founded on community-based security provision, and will take place concurrently with political negotiations, reconciliation and reconstruction. [487]
It is obvious that every effort must be made to remove both weapons and
the motivation or need to carry weapons, froIncreasingly shrill demands for an immediate disarmament of armed
forces within Darfur in the face of the reality outlined by the United
Nations, Charles Snyder and Dr de Waal serve no purpose other than
enflaming an already fraught situation.m the Darfur situation.
Footnotes
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