DARFUR IN PERSPECTIVE
By Professor David Hoile
Published by The European - Sudanese Public Affairs Council
Chapter 3
HUMANITARIAN AID ACCESS IN DARFUR
It is strange to see that there is still the notion in
the world that nothing is happening and we’re
completely blocked from accessing Darfur. We are reaching
some 800,000 people at the moment with some
sort of assistance and food. Jan Egeland,
UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, July
2004 [283] Most of the underserved areas remain
rebel-held, many of which have not been
accessible to UN agencies because of a series of security incidents
and a delay in obtaining SLA agreement and
understanding of humanitarian rules and principles laid
out in agreements
United Nations Report, December 2004 [284]
There has been considerable sensationalism with
regard to humanitarian aid access to Darfur. There
have been attempts to claim that the government
has been systematically denying humanitarian access to Darfur
and Darfur’s war-affected communities. The reality
is that ensuring humanitarian access to the war-affected
communities while a political solution is sought
is the single most important task facing both the
Sudanese government and the international community. At the same time
it is clear that a continuing humanitarian crisis, especially
one in which aid workers cannot gain access to
war-affected communities, is in the best interests
of the rebel movements. It is now equally obvious that the
rebel movement have not only been seeking to deny humanitarian access
to government-controlled areas by attacks on aid workers– attacks
which in turn result in aid agencies suspending activities in
parts of Darfur – and by attacks on humanitarian
aid convoys: they have also denying the international
community access to rebel-controlled areas, thereby
severely affected the very people they claim to protect. All
of Sudanese government. Any study of the Darfur
crisis must examine the aid issue in some depth. Humanitarian
access to displaced communities in Darfur is essential in addressing
the crisis. The international community must be aware of the extent
to which emergency relief and food aid in such circumstances
can and has been manipulated.
The Government of Sudan would
appear to have acted responsibly with regard
to humanitarian access to Darfur. The facts speak for themselves. In
September 2003, the Government of Sudan and the SLA signed an agreement
allowing “free and unimpeded” humanitarian
access within Darfur. [285] In less than 12 months
the Sudanese government had agreed and facilitated
an increase in aid workers present in Darfur, from two foreigners
and a few dozen nationals in September 2003, to just under 6,000
aid workers – over 700 of them expatriates – by
August 2004. [286] By the end of 2004, there
were 9,100 aid workers in Darfur. [287] The signing
of the April 2004 ceasefire made it safer and thus much consequently
easier for aid agencies to operate in Darfur. The UN 2004 end
of year humanitarian action report stated that “much
credit has to be given to the [government]
Humanitarian Affairs Ministry whose officials
worked tirelessly to enforce the provision of the Joint Communique
of 3 July [guaranteeing access].” [288]
On
6 July 2004, the government issued 15 decrees which included measures
to enhance security in Darfur; the establishment of police stations
in displaced people camps; to facilitate the ceasefire commission
and African Union monitoring force; to streamline the granting
of visas for aid workers in Darfur; the exemption of all humanitarian
aid imports from any restrictions, customs tariffs or personal
fees; the repeal of measures regarding specifications on
the humanitarian aid imports into Darfur;
to facilitate freedom of movement for
those working in the humanitarian aid organizations in Darfur;
to facilitate the flow of humanitarian
aid to displaced people in Darfur; to exempt
humanitarian aid from the health and medical regulations
in Darfur; the exemption of agricultural
inputs, fodders, and seeds in Darfur from
any restrictions, customs tariffs or personal fees; exemption from
import restrictions of humanitarian aid imports into Darfur;
to activate the measures regarding the
governments of the Darfur states to guarantee
the flow of humanitaria aid and humanitarian aid imports into
Darfur and to encourage the return of the displaced to their
villages; and to facilitate the work of
the fact-finding commission in regard to the allegations
of human rights violations committed by armed groups in Darfur.
As of October 2004, there
were 155 locations assisting with internally displaced
people in the three Darfur states, and the World Food Programme
is present in 136 of these centres. [289] There are now dozens of
international and national non-governmental organisations working
in Darfur. [290] Speaking in June 2004, the outgoing
UN Humanitarian Coordinator for Sudan, Mr Kevin Kennedy, confirmed
that visas were generally being granted within
48 hours – as promised by
the Government of Sudan – and that “people
are experiencing very few visa difficulties”. [291]
That there have been propagandistic attempts to claim that
the government was deliberately blocking access to Darfur by
aid workers is apparent. The United Nations Under-Secretary-General
for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr Jan Egeland, speaking
in July 2004, commented on some of these claims.
He said: “It is strange
to see that there is still the notion in the world
that nothing is happening and we’re completely
blocked from accessing Darfur. We are reaching some 800,000
people at the moment with some sort of assistance and food.” [292] By
September 2004, the World Food Programme was feeding some 940,000
conflict-affected people in Darfur. [293] The presence of several thousand
aid workers in Darfur provides clear evidence of the Khartoum government’s
commitment to the provision of food and medical relief to Darfur’s war-affected communities.
The international community
must be aware of the extent to which humanitarian
issues can be manipulated for political effect. [294] For rebels a
humanitarian crisis is a no-lose situation. A humanitarian crisis
always
reflects badly on the government in the country affected. And
a
humanitarian crisis is something which can be created and deepened. One
of the goals of most insurgencies is to internationalise the
conflict to which they are a party. One of
the easiest means of doing so is toprovoke a humanitarian crisis.
This is precisely what the Darfur rebels succeeded
in doing. Merely starting the war in Darfur initiated a humanitarian
crisis in western Sudan. The escalation of the conflict and the
government’s response to it led to a deepening crisis
and considerable displacement of populations – a
feature of most wars. The rebels, however,
have deliberately sought to heighten the humanitarian crisis
they created by starting the war by additionally seeking to
escalate food insecurity knowing full well
that this would be the focus of immediate
international attention. As early as July 2003, for example, the
UN news service reported on rebel attempts to disrupt food
security in the affected areas: “SLA
rebels regularly attacked and looted villages taking
food and sometimes killing people…The attacks
present a real threat to people’s food
security and livelihoods, by preventing them from planting and accessing markets to buy food.” [295]
The provision of humanitarian
relief such as food aid and medical supplies
has historically also been a bonus to rebel movements. Firstly, international
access impinges upon the national sovereignty of the country
concerned, a net propaganda victory for anti-government forces as
it brings with it international attention. Secondly, international agencies
provide food and emergency supplies which help to sustain communities
within rebel-controlled areas and can often be diverted by rebel
forces. It was widely acknowledged, for example, that vast amounts
of food aid were diverted during the war in southern Sudan. In July
1998, in one instance, the Roman Catholic Bishop of the starvationaffected diocese
of Rumbek, Monsignor Caesar Mazzolari, stated that the
SPLA were stealing 65 percent of the food aid going into rebel-held areas
of southern Sudan. Agence France Presse also reported that:“
Much of the relief food going to more than a million famine
victims in rebel-held areas of southern
Sudan is ending up in the hands of the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), relief workers
said.” [296] It is also clear that
rebel forces in Darfur are also directly misappropriating food
aid and equipment stolen from relief agencies. This is a
point made by humanitarian aid expert, Professor Sarah Kenyon
Lischer. Interviewed in January 2005,
she noted that: “Recently,
the World Food Program has had over a
dozen of its trucks hijacked. And the aid that was
on t hose trucks has been stolen. The trucks reportedly have
been repainted and used for military purposes
by the rebels. And so that’s just a
very obvious way that aid can be used for war.” [297]
This had happened was confirmed by the
United Nations: “The United Nations
said it was also concerned about reports
that Darfur-based rebel forces have stolen 13
commercial all terrain trucks leased to WFP and loaded with
food in the last two weeks. These thefts
are in addition to multiple losses of commercial
and aid agency vehicles to armed groups in recent months, [the
UN said]. More alarming are reports that the rebel group
that stole them may now be using some
of these trucks for military purposes, it said.” [298]
The UN Sudan Envoy Jan Pronk stated: “Such
misuses of humanitarian assets should
cease immediately. All trucks and other equipment
taken by armed groups from humanitarian organizations should
be returned without delay so that relief operations are not hindered further.” [299]
The rebels have, from the
earliest days of the insurgency, sought to escalate
humanitarian access difficulties by deliberately targeting aid workers.
They murdered nine World Food Programme truck drivers, and wounded
14 others, in an attack on a relief convoy in October 2003. [300] All
this followed a set pattern by rebels in other parts of Sudan,
tactics which have previously succeeded in
creating a humanitarian crisis in southern
Sudan. The veteran American journalist Robert Kaplan noted, for
example: “On June 1, 1986, twelve Kenyan truck
drivers bringing food into the south
from the Ugandan border town of Nimule were ambushed…The
drivers were bound by ropes to their steering wheels, and
then grenades were lobbed at the trucks. This put a virtual
halt to the 90,000 tons had been delivered.” [301]
In November 2003 the Government
accused rebels in Darfur of killing two of
its relief workers and abducting three others in an attack on
an aid convoy. Humanitarian Aid Commissioner
Sulaf Eddin Salih said his government is worried
about the “continued” rebel
attacks which he said“
threaten the humanitarian operations and result in losing
human lives and worsening the humanitarian
situation”. He appealed
to the international community to
intervene to halt and denounce the“
repeated” armed operations on the humanitarian assistance
convoys. [302]
Put quite simply, insecurity
severely curtails humanitarian aid access. In the
words of a UN humanitarian relief spokesman: “You
can’t give aid when there
are bullets flying.” [303] In January 2004,
for example, UN media sources
reported that “about 85 percent of
the 900,000 waraffected people
in Darfur…are inaccessible to humanitarian
aid…mainly because of insecurity.” [304]
In December 2003, the UN quoted the Government
as saying “The problem is in areas controlled
by the SLM. Our experience has
made us hesitant to send relief to areas under the SLM
because of kidnapping and attacks on trucks.” [305]
In October 2003, in the wake of
the above-mentioned attacks, the United States government
asked the Sudanese government for help with security
and access. [306] One month later,
rebel gunmen killed two other relief workers and
abducted three others. [307] Rebels have also kidnapped
other relief workers. In a further example of interference
with humanitarian work, JEM
gunmen admitted abducting five aid workers working
for the Swiss humanitarian group Medair. [308]
On 11 February 2004, JEM declared
its intention to close down every road within
Darfur. It would have been aware of the devastating consequences
this would have on the ability of the government and aid agencies
(national and international) to provide emergency assistance
to those communities suffering in Darfur.
This was at precisely the same time, in February
2004, as the United Nations high commissioner for refugees
warned of a humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur. Médecins
Sans Frontières had also warned that
there was not enough food or water in the desert region. [309]
In February 2004, the state minister at the
Ministry for Humanitarian Affairs, Mohammed Youssef
Moussa, commented on an attack on Save the
Children: “It is true that (the rebels) have
started causing damage and
today, in particular, they planted a land mine near the
town of Ambro that went
off, wounding a lorry driver and his assistant.
The lorry was carrying
medical supplies and belonged to Save the Children
Fund-UK. So if this is
what they are talking about, then they are...abandoning
all humanitarian principles.” [310]
In
early January 2004 the Sudanese government said
its troops were trying
to secure deliveries of humanitarian aid to people
caught up in the Darfur
conflict. The ministry of humanitarian affairs
said a government delegation
had completed a nine-day tour of West and South
Darfur states during which
it had examined the obstacles hindering the delivery of
assistance to parts of the region. The ministry
stated that the obstacles included
insecurity and instability. The delegation said
the government armed forces “are
working to tighten their grip on the situation” which would
ease the delivery of relief supplies to some areas.
The delegation instructed the offices of the Humanitarian
Aid Commission (HAC) in Darfur to speed up distribution of relief supplies. [311]
On 10 February 2004, the United
Nations said that aid access had improved
within Darfur. The UN spokesman for the humanitarian coordinator
for Sudan, Ben Parker, stated: “There
are signs and indications
that we will be able to reach more places in
the coming weeks
and the government is assuring us that the access
situation will improve”.
The government had told aid agencies that it
had opened 10 new
corridors in Darfur for relief convoys to move
through. [312] The UN Emergency
Relief Coordinator, Jan Egeland, described the
agreement with the
Sudanese government to provide improved aid access
to Darfur as a breakthrough. [313]
As part of the UN-government agreement, on 18 February
2004, the UN announced that a 13-person UN logistical
team arrived in
Darfur to assess humanitarian needs in the area.
The team would assess
aid requirements in the cities of Nyala, al-Geneina
and al- Fasher as
UN agencies work to deliver and pre-position
food, water and medical supplies for around 250,000 displaced
people. [314]
Rebel attacks on relief convoys
continued. A senior UN official in Sudan stated
in February 2004 that rebels have made it too dangerous to take
aid into parts of Darfur. Aid convoys were still being attacked
by armed groups. The spokesman also cited
the danger of landmines.” [315] In March
2004, the Sudanese government held rebels responsible for blocking
deliveries of humanitarian aid in Darfur. Deputy Foreign Minister
al-Tigani Salih Fidhail said: “The
armed groups constitute the main obstacle to
the delivery of relief in Darfur.” He called on the international community to hold the rebels “fully
responsible”. [316]
A high-level UN humanitarian
assessment mission, under the leadership of
World Food Programme Executive Director James Morris, visited Darfur
in late April 2004. Rebel attacks on aid workers continued. At
the same time the SLA attacked a humanitarian
convoy, killing a traditional leader
of the Zaghawa, Abdel Rahman Mohammain, who
was leading it. [317]
The International Crisis Group noted continuing
rebel obstruction in May
2004: “The SLA issued several statements
in the first half of May to the
effect that it will refuse to allow into
areas it controls any humanitarian relief
that originates in government-controlled
areas - where most UN and international NGOs are based.” [318]
In early June 2004, Associated
Press reported the abduction by rebels of 16
aid workers. Those kidnapped worked for the International Rescue Committee,
Save the Children UK, the UN Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), United Nation’s
World Food Programme,
UNICEF, the Norwegian Refugee Council, ECHO,
the Humanitarian
Aid Office of the European Commission, and
Sudan’s Humanitarian
Aid Commission. They were stopped while were conducting
assessments to prepare the way for delivery
of relief assistance
for displaced people in the vicinity of Al
Hilief in North Darfur
despite driving vehicles clearly bearing
the UN insignia. [319] They were
eventually released by the rebels. The UN
Emergency Relief Coordinator,
Jan Egeland, condemned the detention and
delayed release of
the 16 aid workers as “totally unacceptable” and “contradicts
solemn promises” made
by the SLA. Egeland said that “Too
much time has already
been lost in this race against the clock
to save more than a million
lives threatened by indiscriminate violence,
starvation and disease.” The
UN stated that “[t]he
incident not only threatened the safety and
security of humanitarian workers, but has
interrupted and delayed aid to desperately needy civilians
in Darfur.” [320]
On 8 June 2004, Agence France
Presse reported that rebels had seized nine
trucks loaded with relief items, medicines and tents on the road between
Nyala and al-Fasher. The rebels abducted four of the drivers and
beat a fifth one. [321] Later that month, rebels attacked a humanitarian relief
convoy in Darfur, stealing 57 tons of UN food aid. Ibrahim Hamid,
the minister of humanitarian affairs, said: “These types
of rebel action are the most serious threat
to the humanitarian and security situation.” [322]
In the first week of July,
the SLA attacked 26 aid workers, working for Save
the Children UK, delivering emergency assistance in northern Darfur.
They also stole six vehicles and a large amount of cash. On 13 July
2004, the British government publicly urged Sudanese rebels to return
the stolen vehicles. [323] It was reported on 12 July 2004 that
rebels had attacked several towns in north
Darfur. These had included Al Liayet, Al Towaisha
and Um Keddada. Several civilians had been killed, and
a judge and bank manager had been kidnapped. The government of North
Darfur stated that there had been over 50 rebel violations of
the Ndjamena ceasefire agreement. [324] At about
the same time rebel militias were
also accused of kidnapping 32 children
during attacks on several villages. [325]
There were a number of systematic
rebel attacks on aid workers in August 2004.
The African Union confirmed that, on 22 August, SLA forces had
abducted humanitarian affairs workers on their way to a meeting
in the Abgaragil area, and that on 23 August rebels had abducted
medical aid workers engaged in an inoculation campaign in Kutum. [326]
At the end of August 2004, Darfur rebels abducted six aid workers
in north Darfur. Three were from the World Food Programme and
three from the Sudanese Red Crescent. WFP condemned the targeting
of humanitarian workers. WFP Senior Deputy Executive Director
Jean-Jacques Graisse said that WFP was “delighted
that our people, as well as those working
for the Sudanese Red Crescent, have been freed unharmed. This is not, however, the first time that humanitarian workers have been targeted in Darfur. At a time
when all agencies are battling the rainy season,
poor infrastructure and an unpredictable security
environment to deliver desperately needed humanitarian
assistance, this kind of incident can only further worsen the
plight of the needy in Darfur. We call upon all armed groups
in the region to stop targeting those involved
in humanitarian work and allow them to do
their duty without fear of intimidation. Any continuation or escalation
of incidents such as the one just resolved is likely to have
farreaching consequences for the relief operation.” [327]
On 31 August 2004, JEM gunmen detained 22
Sudanese health workers near Nyala in south Darfur. [328]
In late August, the United Nations humanitarian coordinator
for Sudan, Manuel Aranda da Silva, stated that he was encouraged
by Sudan’s actions to improve the humanitarian situation
in Darfur. [329]
In October 2004, the Sudanese
government’s chief negotiator
at Abuja, Dr Majzoub al-Khalifa, warned
that the rebels were seeking to worsen affairs
in Darfur: “They need to stimulate all these
governments and all these organizations
on their side by making the situation worse on the ground.” [330]
October also saw rebel threats to kill aid workers. [331] A
SLA landmine killed two Save the Children
Fund workers in Darfur. Two other Save the Children workers,
one British and one Sudanese, were killed
in October by a landmine laid by SLA rebels. [332] The United Nations
special envoy to Sudan Jan Pronk unambiguously confirmed rebel
involvement in these deaths: “It was the rebels
who are responsible for attacking relief
workers and convoys, they are responsible for…landmines which killed two relief workers.” [333]
That same month, the United
Nations reported that “UN
spokesman Fred Eckhard said in New York
that the operations of humanitarian agencies in
North Darfur State have become limited because some roads
remain closed to them. Other areas have
become dangerous for transporting aid supplies.
Last Saturday, forces from the rebel Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)
hijacked seven commercial trucks on a road about 120 kilometres east
of the state capital El Fasher.” [334] A spokeswoman
for the UN Advance Mission in Sudan
(UNAMIS) stated that “[t]he
repeated ceasefire violations of the
past month have had a very serious impact on the
UN’s ability to deliver humanitarian assistance
to affected populations.” [335]
In mid-November 2004, the
United Nations said that nearly 200,000 needy
people, especially in the mountainous Jebel Marra area in central Darfur
and the northern part of North Darfur, had been cut off from relief
aid because of escalating violence. The German press agency reported: “The
U.N. said tension in the region had risen as rebel groups, in
particular the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), had increased their operations
in an apparent attempt to claim more territory.” The Humanitarian
Coordinator for Sudan, Manuel Aranda da Silva, said an estimated
150,000 people have been driven from their homes due to the escalating
violence during the past month. The UN also reported several attacks
on buses and aid convoys around Darfur. Travellers had been abducted
and even killed and vehicles looted by the attackers. [336] By the end
of November, The New York Times was reporting that the rebels had
been “sharply ratcheting up attacks” which in
turn was preventing relief work. [337]
In November 2004 the rebels
were accused of attacking a joint WHO/Ministry
of Health medical team. One doctor was killed and four other
health workers were injured. The team was also robbed. [338] In
the same month both the Dublin-based GOAL aid
agency and the Spanish branch of Médecins
Sans Frontières were forced
to withdraw their staff from the Jebel Marra
area in central Darfur after “repeated” rebel
acts of aggression targeting the humanitarian
personnel and the relief supplies intended
for people in need. [339] Both MSF and GOAL complained that rebels
had attacked their vehicles. [340] On 27 November 2004, The New York
Times revealed the degree of rebel obstruction of aid delivery
and aid workers: “On the ground, many
aid workers, too fearful of giving their names
for fear of jeopardizing their work, say that rebel officials have
made unreasonable demands on aid groups operating in their territory,
at one point insisting on a certain number of expatriates to accompany
Sudanese staff, whom rebels distrust as potential government
spies. Aid workers have also been detained in rebel territory in recent months.” [341]
Amnesty International noted
a similar pattern of rebel activity: “over
the past two months, a number of World
Food Program commercial trucks have been
attacked in South Darfur.” [342] It also noted that: “After
Sudan Liberation Army forces reportedly hijacked seven commercial
trucks east of al-Fasher on 23 October,
the road between al-Fasher and Um Kedada
in North Darfur was closed and has only just been re-opened. Because
of heavy fighting in the area, the road between al-Fasher
and Kutum remains a no-go zone.”
In early December, The Christian
Science Monitor confirmed the results of rebel
action: “[R]ecently they’ve
stepped up attacks and have even looted
international aid convoys. The violence adds to the instability – and
to aid groups’ growing inability
to help the displaced millions.” [343]
Two Save the Children aid workers, members of a mobile medical
clinic, were murdered by rebels on 12 December 2004.
They were deliberately shot dead in
an attack on an aid convoy. The director of
Save the Children’s international operations said: “We
deplore this brutal killing of humanitarian
workers in Darfur.” The
charity said its vehicles were clearly
marked as belonging to Save the Children. [344] The African
Union and United Nations confirmed the SLA’s
responsibility for the deaths of the
aid workers. In addition to the murdered aid workers,
one other worker was injured and three are missing. African Union
officer Nigerian Major-General Festus Okonkwo stated: “SLA was
involved in the attack as two Land Rovers belonging to
Save the Children (UK) were recovered
from [the] SLA camp in Jurof.” [345]
Rebel involvement in the murders was
established by the UN. [346] In mid- December
the United Nations suspended aid operations in South
Darfur in December in the wake of
these murders. [347] The Guardian reported that
an aid worker was shot on the same road in the summer
but survived.The UN Envoy to Sudan, Jan
Pronk, said of the rebel attacks and interference
with aid deliveries: “They have to stop.
Otherwise they are blocking access to
the very people they say they are protecting.” [348]
In December 2004, Sudan’s Minister
for Humanitarian Affairs, Mohamed Yusif
Abdallah, made the obvious point that “[w]here
the rebels create insecurity, it is not
the government denying access.” [349]
The United Nations Darfur Humanitarian
Profile released in December 2004 has stated,
for example, that: “Despite prevailing insecurity
in the three Darfur States, 79% of Darfur
conflict affected population is currently accessible
to UN humanitarian workers. Most of the underserved areas remain
rebel-held, many of which have not been accessible to UN agencies
because of a series of security incidents and a delay in obtaining
SLA agreement and understanding of humanitarian rules and principles
laid out in agreements.” [350] [Emphasis added]
The rebels are endangering the lives of
hundreds of thousands of civilians already malnourished and badly affected by the conflict in Darfur.
On 15 December 2004, the United
Nations reported further rebel attacks on
food aid convoys: “WFP reports that food distribution
has been seriously disrupted by ongoing
insecurity. On 18 December 2004, the SLA
detained a total of 13 trucks. Five of them were released
on the same day but the rest were kept
until 21 Dec…the disruption
affected food distribution in Marla
and Sania Fundu. Food assistance has also been
halted in Labado, Al Juruf, Muhujarija, Khor Abechi, Manawashi, Mershing,
Rokero and Gildo Labado.” [351]
On 22 December 2004, The New
York Times has also reported that:“
The chaotic situation in Darfur has hampered the work of
agencies trying to reach the estimated
2.3 million people who rely on aid to survive.
Aid organizations in the region say rebels have been attacking
convoys carrying aid and goods along the road between Nyala
and El Fasher, where two Save the
Children UK workers were killed recently.” [352]
Ongoing rebel attacks, particularly
that on the market town of Ghubaysh on 27
December, had disastrous effects on the delivery of food aid
to affected communities. The United Nations noted
The World Food Programme
(WFP) has suspended food convoys to the
Darfur States following a large scale attack yesterday by rebel forces
on the market town of Ghubaysh…WFP has
halted three convoys of seventy
trucks carrying more than 1,300 MT of WFP food aid
destined for El Fasher and Nyala…this recent
insecurity has cut off assistance
to some 260,000 people who will miss their December rations
in the South Darfur as well as eastern parts of West Darfur…Notably,
it is the second attack by the SLA since 19
December when the Government of Sudan agreed to an
immediate cessation of hostilities.
This latest insecurity has serious consequences
for the UN and NGOs operations in Darfur, as it effectively
blocks overland access from central Sudan to the Darfur region.
This has a particular impact on WFP’s
provision of lifesaving food aid,
as it must rely heavily on road deliveries to support its
Darfur humanitarian operation. The United Nations is
also concerned about reports that
Darfur-based rebel movement forces
have stolen in the last two weeks thirteen commercial
all terrain trucks leased to WFP,
loaded with urgently required WFP food commodities
for the affected people of Darfur dedicated to the transportation
of food aid to Darfur…The latest
thefts are in addition to multiple
losses of commercial and aid agency vehicles to armed groups
in recent months. More alarming are reports that the
rebel groups that stole them may
now [be] using some of these trucks for military purposes. [353]
A
World Food Programme spokeswoman said: “The attacks
followed a week of insecurity
in Darfur and this has caused difficulties, in terms
of providing assistance. It will delay urgently required
food for 260,000 people
in South Darfur and the eastern parts of West Darfur.” [354] UNAMIS
noted that the rebel attack on Ghubaysh was “the
second carried out by
the rebels since 19 December, when the Sudanese government
agreed to an immediate cessation of hostilities”.
The UN Envoy to Sudan
concluded: “The problems of
Darfur cannot be solved through
military means. The parties to the conflict have
to live up to their commitments,
including their responsibility to ensure the safety and
wellbeing of their own people and their unhindered
access to humanitarian assistance.” [355]
The rebels’ murder of
aid workers has had the desired effect – the intensification
of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur with the ultimate aim of
forcing some sort of military intervention. It has gone hand-in-hand with
the SLA’s deliberate breaking of ceasefire
agreements with attacks in
northern Darfur. This precipitated the current
humanitarian crisis in Darfur.
Associated Press reported that: “The
United Nations has condemned
a rebel attack in Darfur province, saying it violates
a ceasefire agreement
and jeopardises the lives of tens of thousands
of people who will not
receive aid because of the fighting.” [356]
The international community
has roundly condemned these rebel actions. [357] These systematic
rebel attacks have placed hundreds of thousands
of waraffected communities
in danger of starvation. The Director of Save the Children
UK, Mike Aaronson, stated that: “We
are devastated that we are
unable to continue to offer health care, nutritional
support, child protection
and education to the approximately 250,000 children
and family members served
by our current programs. However, we just cannot
continue to expose our staff to the unacceptable
risks they face as they go about their humanitarian duties in Darfur.” [358]
Erwin Van Der Borght, deputy director of Amnesty
International’s Africa programme, has also
noted the effect of rebel attacks: “Attacks knowingly
and intentionally directed against personnel involved in humanitarian
assistance in armed conflict may constitute war crimes. Insecurity
within Darfur hinders movement to whole districts, so that food,
medicine and other non-food items can not be brought in. This increases
enormously the sufferings of an already vulnerable population.” Amnesty
International noted that “After
such attacks, the district or road is likely to
be declared a no-go area for international humanitarian
staff for several days” and pointed out that
it stopped aid reaching “thousands” of displaced people. [359]
On 31 December 2004, The
Daily Telegraph reported on SLA attacks in December
had “forced the United Nations to suspend supply
convoys into Darfur”: “The SLA
attacks seemed to be designed to isolate Darfur. The
rebels struck police stations in the town of Ghibaish and al-Majrour in
the neighbouring province of West Kordofan, killing 99 people.
The ensuing battle closed Darfur’s main
communication artery.” [360]
In his January
2005 report on Darfur, the United Nations Secretary- General
reported on what he termed a “new trend” in
the pattern of attacks on, and harassment
of, international aid workers: “While previous
incidents have only been aimed at looting supplies and goods, December
has seen acts of murder and vicious assaults on staff, forcing some
agencies to leave Darfur.” [361] The Secretary-General’s
February 2005 assessment of the preceding
six month period with regard to the rebel
movements was also bleak: “Their attacks on police
have increased and often seemed intended
to invite retaliation. These attacks and provocation
have at times indirectly impaired humanitarian access. Some
rebel groups have directly impeded humanitarian work by looting cars
and trucks and putting pressure on, or even abducting national
staff of humanitarian organizations. Many of these actions
have severely reduced delivery of assistance.” [362]
Footnotes |
 |
|
