“A WORD THAT MEANS EVERYTHING AND NOTHING”: THE “JANJAWEED” IN DARFUR
“Comprehensive, forcible disarmament is hazardous at best, impossible at worst. Before effective disarmament (or
more realistically, regulation of armaments) can take place, a workable definition of the Janjawiid is needed.”
The Justice Africa human rights organisation [1]
“In Darfur, Janjaweed is a word that means everything and nothing.”
The Reuters Sudan Correspondent [2]
One of the biggest problems facing any analysis of the Darfur conflict, and subsequently any
attempt to resolve it, is the extent to which the international community, responding to a
combination of poor analysis, shallow media reporting or, in some instances, straightforward
propaganda projections of one sort or another, has reduced the crisis to one or two images and
demands. The “Janjaweed” phenomena is one such image and with it comes a demand, that the
government of Sudan immediately stop all Janjaweed activity and disarm these people.
The term “Janjaweed” has been used as a blanket term to describe most of the “Arab” fighters
active in Darfur today. The UN has described the “Janjaweed” as being made up of “Sudanese
and Chadian horse and camel-riding Arab nomads, opportunists and ‘criminals’”. [3] The team
leader for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in North Darfur, Niels
Scott, commented in November 2004: “This Janjaweed business – I shy away a bit from it.
Janjaweed – as an historical concept – has been around for years. What we are seeing now
is…criminality.” [4] There can be no simple reading of the issue. [5] Darfur is an ecologically
fragile area and had already been subject to growing – and often armed – conflict over access
to water and pastures. The war has greatly exacerbated previously-existing tensions. In perhaps
the most objective reading of the crisis in Darfur, the UN media service observed: “The
conflict pits farming communities against nomads who have aligned themselves with the
militia groups – for whom the raids are a way of life – in stiff competition for land and
resources. The militias, known as the Janjaweed, attack in large numbers on horseback and
camels and are driving the farmers from their land, often pushing them towards town centres.” [6]
There is also no doubt that these militias, and criminal gangs, have exploited the security gap
which opened up in Darfur following the murder by rebels of over 400 policemen and the
destruction of dozens of police stations in a region the size of France or California in which
law enforcement infrastructure was already badly stretched.
The scale of the violence in Darfur, even before the outbreak of rebellion in 2003, had led to
Khartoum introducing special measures, including the declaration of a state of emergency [7] and
the establishment by presidential decree of eight special criminal courts to deal with offences
such as murder, tribal clashes, armed robbery, arson and the smuggling of weapons.
The UN media service has reported “that there was nothing new about tribal clashes between
nomads of Arabic extraction and village farmers belonging to local African tribes in Darfur,
but these days they have become much more deadly because the raiders were better armed.” A
foreign diplomat noted: “The Janjawid have kept their traditional values and ways of living.
They do the same as they used to: they steal to get. Only this time, their weapons are more
sophisticated.” [8]
It has also become apparent that the Darfur issue has been caught up in the sort of propaganda
and misinformation that has characterised previous coverage of Sudan. Several commentators
appear to have opted for a partisan or lazy analysis of events in Darfur, seemingly unable to
resist projecting the image of government-supported “Arab” – “Janjaweed” – militias attacking
“African” villagers (and in doing so often merely echoing questionable rebel claims).
The Sudanese authorities have repeatedly and consistently denied that they are sponsoring “Janjaweed” gunmen in Darfur. Sudanese leaders from the President and ministers downwards
have described “Janjaweed” gunmen as “outlaws”. [9] The Sudanese foreign minister, Dr
Mustapha Osman Ismail, has noted: “The problem is the word Janjaweed has become a
coverall for so many things. There are militias that are outside the rule of law, and this is one of
the things we are going to crack down on.” [10] Simplistic readings of events in Darfur claim that
Khartoum is in control of all those groups labelled as “Janjaweed” - this despite increasing
evidence that these forces are out of control. [11]
Assertions that the government controls the “Janjaweed” – and that it can turn their activities
off and on like a tap – have distorted the reality of events. Human rights groups, for example,
have confirmed Janjaweed attacks on policemen and police stations. Amnesty International has
noted the fact that policemen are often targeted for attack by Janjaweed gangs. [12] “Janjaweed”
gangs are also reported to have attacked Arab tribes. [13]
A May 2004 United Nations media report stated that diplomats and Chadian government
officials “question how much control Khartoum has over these nomadic horsemen”. [14] That the
militiamen that have come to be known as “Janjaweed” are out of control is clear. Many of
these gunmen have on several occasions attacked civilians in Chad. [15] That Sudan would have
had very little to gain from attacks on Chad is clear. Chad is a mediator in the Darfur conflict.
Chadian President Déby has in fact been accused of being sympathetic towards Khartoum,
having, for example, previously committed several hundred Chadian soldiers to joint
operations with the Sudanese army. [16] Ahmad Allami, President Idriss Déby’s official spokesman, stated: “Now, there is the feeling that Sudan does not have control over the militia
and needs assistance.” [17] Chad’s acting Defence Minister, Emmanuel Nadingar, announced that,
on 5 May 2004, the Chadian army clashed with a raiding party of Janjaweed 25 kilometres
inside Chadian territory and killed 60 of them. One Chadian soldier was killed and seven
others were wounded in the battle. The UN report stated that “One captured Janjaweed fighter
who was presented to the press in Chad this week confirmed fears that the militia were
operating on their own initiative without necessarily following orders from Khartoum.” The
gunman stated: “Nobody sent us to Chad.” [18] The idea that the Khartoum authorities would
have directed militiamen under its control to attack Chadian civilians and President Déby’s
forces would make no sense - and clearly demonstrates the anarchy associated with those
groups labelled as “Janjaweed”.
The Khartoum authorities have taken several steps to end abuses in Darfur. In June 2004, the
Sudanese President ordered security forces to disarm all groups, including rebels and progovernment
militia, in the conflict-ridden region of Darfur: “What happened in Darfur is
bloody and severe for all Sudanese people, not only the Darfurians.” [19] The Sudanese President
announced a few days later that both Sudan and Chad had agreed to cooperate in the disarming
of militias on both sides of their border: “We have completed an agreement with Chad to
collect arms in Darfur and the Chadian lands neighbouring Darfur at the same time…To
disarm the groups in one area without the other would not help in resolving the problem.” [20]
Khartoum’s commitment to crack down on armed groups and gunmen in Darfur has been
repeated on several occasions, including during the visit to Sudan by American Secretary of
State Colin Powell. [21]
In its response to the January 2005 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to
Darfur to the United Nations Secretary-General, the Government of Sudan pointed to the
central flaw in the report, that “The Commission failed in the single most important task it
should have set itself – an accurate and adequate definition of the term “Janjaweed”…The
irretrievable flaw in the Commission’s report was its inability or unwillingness to differentiate
between operations within civilian areas, including military operations against rebel positions
within villages, carried out by regular and irregular Government forces – for which the
Government accepts full responsibility – and a pattern of attacks within civilian areas and
villages carried out by groups unconnected in any way to the Government of Sudan. This
intrinsic flaw is in large part the result of the Commission’s inability to adequately or
accurately analyse or define the term Janjaweed.” The Government pointed out that by way of
definition the Commission stated: “Victims of attacks consistently refer to their attackers as
Janjaweed…When asked to provide further details, victims report that the Janjaweed attackers
are from Arab tribes and, in most instances, attacked on horseback or on camels an were armed
with automatic weapons of various types.” The Commission notes as “precisions” that their
attackers were Arab and armed with modern weapons central to defining “Janjaweed”. The
Commission said outside of these “precisions” it is “probably impossible to define the
‘Janjaweed’”. The imprecision of the definition is glaring [emphasis added]. The Commission
additionally states that “where victims describe their attackers as Janjaweed, these persons
might be from a tribal Arab militia, from the PDF or from some other entity…”. The Government also pointed out that: “In most cases…victims did not differentiate between
Government armed forces on the one hand, and militias and other groups acting, or perceived
to be acting, with the support of Government authorities, on the other. When asked whether the
perpetrators were Government armed forces or Janjaweed, one victim stated that ‘for us, these
are one and the same’.” [emphasis added] This is significant for three reasons. Firstly, it is
clear that rather than seeking to adequately differentiate between operations by Government
forces and attacks by non-Government forces, the Commission would appear to have taken the
easy option of saying that these are one and the same thing when it clear there are reasonable
grounds for doubt…Most significantly of all is that given that the definition of ‘Janjaweed’ at
the heart of the Commission’s report basically reflects the above view, it is clear that the
report reflects a subjective rather and an objective view. The Commission has, by its own
admission, consciously reflected subjective perceptions of what constitutes the ‘Janjaweed’
rather than reaching an objective and legally sustainable finding on this controversial issue.”
[emphasis added] [22]
The Reuters correspondent in Sudan, Nima el-Baghir, has outlined the difficulties in defining
the term “Janjaweed”: “In Darfur, Janjaweed is a word that means everything and nothing. It is
a composite word deriving literally from jinn – which in Arabic means devils or spirits,
carrying G-3 rifles on a jowad (horse).” [23] Her conclusion has also been echoed by other
journalists. The Los Angeles Times, for example, has noted that “[t]he word ‘janjaweed’
means different things to different people. The term, traditionally used to refer to bandits and
criminals, is a combination of Arabic words that convey the idea of evil gunmen on
horseback.”
In her article Ms el-Baghir interviewed an Arab tribal leader and asked him if he would call
himself a Janjaweed leader.
He responds furiously: ‘What is this word “militia”? What are “Janjaweed”? These
words mean nothing.’ For years, he says, his people have defended themselves without
government help. ‘Would you entrust those you are responsible for, your women and
children, to a government which is so far away?’ He pauses as the voices of his men
chorus around him in agreement. ‘When they came to us and said we will give you
weapons to fight against the rebels, we said: keep your weapons. Let us use our own.’
Abdullah falls quiet, while some of the men with him proudly show me their guns.
One says, ‘The government rifles were old but ours are from abroad and they are
better. We bought them from Zagawa traders.’
In a different interview, Musa Hilal, a Darfurian tribal leader accused of being a Janjaweed
leader, also addressed the use of the term. “Janjaweed means nothing, but it is a word used to
encompass all evil, a convenient way for Americans to understand who are the good guys and
who are the bad. When the rebellion began last year, the government approached us and armed
us. My sons were armed by the government and joined the Border Intelligence. Some
tribesmen joined the Popular Defense Force.” [24] He has also pointed to the vagueness of the
term: “The rebels spread the word Janjaweed as if it were an organisation. As a political group
there is no specific concept called Janjaweed…It means nothing, but has been used to mean everything.” Hilal explained his tribe’s involvement in the fighting as an inter-tribal conflict.
He stated that his clan had suffered from “acts of banditry”, including the murder of young
men and livestock theft, carried out by the neighbouring Zaghawa tribe. The Zaghawa and Fur
then entered into an alliance against Arab tribes. Human Rights Groups and the UN have
confirmed that there was tit-for-tat violence in the lead up to the rebellion. [25] There is no doubt
that Hilal is the leader of paramilitary forces raised by the government in response to the
rebellion, forces separate from those groups of criminal opportunists that have increased their
activities since the destruction of the police force in 2003. That some of these organised
paramilitaries have been involved in questionable activities is clear. Their activities must be
divorced from the other essentially criminal activities which have gone on in Darfur since
before the rebellion and which have escalated since. One can only hope that the government is
able to control the sorts of forces seemingly commanded by people like Hilal. He has stated his
view with regard to disarmament: “As far as we as a tribe are concerned, whenever we feel the
situation is completely secure and the ceasefire is being respected, we will hand in our
weapons. The reality is that this is a country where everyone has weapons.” [26]
One Janjaweed leader, interviewed by the London Sunday Times, denied any alignment with
the government: “We are not with the rebels, we are not with the government…we look for our
due…We fight all governments in Sudan. We get nothing from the government.” When asked
about possible international intervention by the UN, the USA or Britain, the Janjaweed stated:
“We will fight them. We hate them and we will attack the foreigners. We refuse to be like Iraq
– surrendered, confused and occupied. We will fight them more than the mujaheddin in
Afghanistan.” [27] The Sunday Times also outlined some of the difficulties facing the
government: “Disarming these warring factions may be impossible. If Khartoum dispatches
more troops to Darfur, it will be in violation of its ceasefire with the two main rebel groups.
Disarmament would in any case enrage the Janjaweed and the African and Arab tribal militias,
who may turn their guns on aid workers and Sudanese soldiers alike, detonating any chance of
relief efforts.” [28]
A largely sensationalist, and on occasion disingenuous, media has lumped together as “Janjaweed” regular army forces, popular defence forces, police units, tribal militias, vigilantes
and armed robbers through to any armed “Arab” tribesman. It is a bit like claiming that the
British government controls not only all army and army reserve units and police and police
reserve units in Northern Ireland but is also controls and is also responsible for all antirepublican
or anti-Catholic loyalist organisations, paramilitaries, gunmen and criminal rackets
in the province. The simple fact is that virtually all of Darfur’s 80 tribes and groups will have
members who are armed, some with members on both sides of the conflict. Some tribal militias
will not disarm unless rival tribes also do so. A western diplomat in Khartoum has noted:
“There are many gangs or groups that (the Sudanese government) doesn’t control or who may
be partly under their control or controlled by the local authorities. So this is not a clear-cut
picture. That makes you understand how difficult (disarmament) is logistically.” [29] According
to the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Mr Jan Egeland
“There are many armed groups and many armed criminal gangs in Darfur.” He referred to the Janjaweed as “a monster that nobody seems to be able to control”. [30] In early November 2004,
the UN Envoy to Sudan also observed: “The government does not control its own forces fully.
It co-opted paramilitary forces and now cannot count on their obedience…The border lines
between the military, the paramilitary and the police are being blurred.” [31] Additionally, in any
instance, there are a number of Arab tribes in Darfur who are not in any way involved in the
conflict. Seeking to disarm those tribes could itself result in considerable armed conflict with
the central government.
Those who attribute every single act of violence or criminality to the “Janjaweed” and claim
that all these acts are on the instructions of the Sudanese government are either naïve or are
seeking to deliberately mislead the international community. In either instance they ill serve
the people of Darfur. It is essential to cut away the propaganda that is already clouding the
Darfur issue. That Khartoum must address the criminality and armed banditry that has
undermined law and order in Darfur is obvious. At the same time, however, lazy commentators
and human rights organisations cannot have it both ways in criticising the Sudanese
government for inaction and then attacking Khartoum for responding firmly to terrorism and
lawlessness.
Claims That All Militias in Darfur can be Disarmed in 30 Days
Unrealistic expectations, often based upon naïve claims, have not assisted with a resolution of
the problem. One issue has been the problem of disarming the many armed groups and
individuals in Darfur. In July 2004, for example, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
1556 threatening action against Sudan if it did not disarm gunmen in Darfur within 30 days. [32]
Charles Snyder, a former United States acting assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs,
and the US State Department’s senior representative on Sudan, has stated, however, that there
are no “30-day, 90-day quick fixes” to the problem. He also admitted: “This is going to take, in
my view, 18 months to two years to conclude the first phase” of making the region safe for
people to return to their homes. [33] De Waal has also warned of international naivety with regard
to “disarming” the Janjaweed:
On July 30, the UN Security Council gave Khartoum 30 days to disarm the Janjawid.
But how? There are many different militia groups, ranging from entire nomadic clans
that have armed themselves to protect their herds, to brigades of trained fighters
headed by Musa Hilal and some of his Chadian Arab comrades in arms. The Janjawid
paramilitaries are the direct responsibility of Khartoum and can be demobilized, but
the armed nomads will be more difficult. In a region where every community has
armed itself, confiscating all arms is frankly impossible: what can be done is
community-based regulated of arms, gradually marginalizing criminal elements
through a process of political reconstruction. [34]
The international community appears to have realised the problems inherent in the 30-day “fixall”
demands. As much was noted by the UN Secretary-General in a report on 30 August 2004:
“Making an area the size of Darfur, with the amount of armed men and violent recent history,
safe and secure for all civilians takes more than 30 days.” [35] The government committed itself
to three steps: ending all offensive military operations; identifying parts of Darfur that could be
made safe within 30 days; and identifying those militias over whom it had control and
instructing them to lay down their weapons. The UN reported that the government had,
nonetheless, started a process of disarming those militias that were under its command. [36]
Janjaweed members have been both arrested and convicted. [37] Four hundred had been arrested
by July. [38]
Justice Africa, the human rights organisation, has outlined realistic measures that can be
undertaken with regard to disarmament:
The most realistic option is twofold. On the one hand, [the government] can control
the paramilitary forces it has established under the command of Musa Hilal and other
commanders. Secondly, it can initiate a process of arms regulation, whereby
communities are permitted to hold arms for legitimate self-defence, in accordance with
norms and procedures agreed by all groups, and they themselves become partners in
disarming the illegitimately armed groups. This kind of disarmament will be gradual,
founded on community-based security provision, and will take place concurrently with
political negotiations, reconciliation and reconstruction. [39]
It is obvious that every effort must be made to remove both weapons and the motivation or
need to carry weapons, from the Darfur situation. Increasingly shrill demands for an immediate
disarmament of armed forces within Darfur in the face of the reality outlined by the United
Nations, Charles Snyder and Dr de Waal serve no purpose other than enflaming an already
fraught situation.
Footnotes
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