DARFUR: THE NEXT AFGHANISTAN?
“Peace in Darfur is necessary for stabilising the surrounding regions which include southern Sudan, Chad, and Central African
Republic and to prevent the conflict spreading. The future of the region is at stake.”
Dr Ali Ali-Dinar
[1]
Any study of the conflict in Darfur can now no longer ignore the clear involvement of Islamist extremists in
fermenting rebellion in western Sudan, namely the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). The Justice and
Equality Movement, at the heart of the Darfur conflict, is led by Dr Khalil Ibrahim, a protégé of Islamist
hardliner Dr Hasan al-Turabi. Formed in November 2002, JEM is increasingly recognised as being part and
parcel of Dr Turabi’s Popular Congress. Time magazine has described JEM as “a fiercely Islamic
organisation said to be led by Hassan al-Turabi” and that Turabi’s ultimate goal is “the presidential palace
in Khartoum and a stridently Islamic Sudan”. [2] Khalil is a long-time associate of Turabi’s and served as a
state minister in Darfur in the early 1990s before serving as a state cabinet-level advisor in southern Sudan.
Ibrahim was a senior member of the Islamist movement’s secret military wing. The International Crisis
Group has noted that “Khalil Ibrahim…is a veteran Islamist and former state minister who sided with the
breakaway [Popular Congress] in 2002 and went into exile in the Netherlands.” [3]
There is additionally evidence of some level of involvement of al-Qaeda with the Islamist JEM
organisation. There is no doubt that al-Qaeda is deeply interested in Darfur. This would be for several
reasons. One is the location of Darfur. American counter-terrorism expert Richard Miniter, in his latest
book, Shadow War: The Untold Story of How Bush is Winning the War on Terror, has reported that
the al-Qaeda network has for some time been establishing itself in the Sahel area, an area which is made up
of Niger, Mali, Chad and Sudan. [4] Dozens of al-Qaeda terrorists were killed in Chad in 2004. [5] Miniter states
that al-Qaeda involvement in Darfur “dovetails with other reports from North Africa. The desert wastes
have become al-Qaeda’s latest battleground.” [6] There is no doubt that al-Qaeda is already seeking to turn
parts of the Sahel – and in this case Darfur – into the next Afghanistan. [7] There are many all-too-familiar
ingredients. Darfur’s physical inaccessibility, its Islamist heritage, its proximity to several failed or semifailed
states, porous borders, and its inaccessibility to western intelligence services make it a very attractive
location to hide in and from which to attack.
Mr Tom Vraalsen, the UN secretary-general’s special envoy for humanitarian affairs for Sudan, has pointed
out some of the regional implications of the Darfur conflict: “A continuation of the problems in Darfur
could have serious political repercussions in the sense that it could destabilize the area along the Chad-
Sudan border and it could have repercussions also regionally if it continues. It has to be brought to an
end.” [8] Dr Ali Ali-Dinar, a Darfurian critic of the government, has made the simple point that “Peace in
Darfur is necessary for stabilising the surrounding regions which include southern Sudan, Chad, and
Central African Republic and to prevent the conflict spreading. The future of the region is at stake.” [9] This is
also precisely why ultra Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda would be interested in a continuing cycle of
violence in Darfur.
And as with Afghanistan – and Iraq for that matter – any Western military intervention in Darfur would
serve as a rallying point for Islamist extremists, both within and outside of Darfur and Sudan. Darfur in any
instance is fertile ground for militant Islamic groups such as al-Qaeda and JEM. ‘Al-Ahram’, for example,
has described Darfur as a “traditional Islamist stronghold”. [10] It was from the Fur and Baggara that
Muhammad Ahmed, the “Mahdi”, drew the fundamentalist shock troops that crushed Egyptian rule in
Sudan and held the British Empire at bay for ten years up till 1898, as noted by Margolis:
“One of the Islamic World’s first anti-colonial movements, known in the west as the Dervishes,
burst from the wastes of Darfur in the 1880s. Led by the fiery ‘Mahdi’, the Dervishes drove the
British imperialists from the Sudan, and event immortalized in the splendid Victorian novel, ‘Four
Feathers.’ The Dervishes took Khartoum, slaying Britain’s proconsul, Sir Charles ‘Chinese’
Gordon.” [11]
And, in Dr Turabi’s close involvement with JEM, there is already a clear al-Qaeda link. Knight Ridder
Africa editor Sudarsan Raghavan described Turabi as “preaching a strict brand of Islam that made Sudan a
haven for extremists such as bin Laden, whom Turabi once called a hero”. [12] That Bin Laden and Turabi are
close is undisputed. Richard Clarke, the Clinton Administration’s anti-terrorism supremo, described Turabi
as a “soul mate” of Osama bin Laden who shared his “vision of a worldwide struggle to establish a pure
Caliphate”. [13] Bin Laden is also married to Turabi’s niece. [14] Many of those members of the military wing of
the Popular Congress now involved with JEM trained with al-Qaeda members in the 1990s. Miniter states
that al-Qaeda instructors, including specialists in guerrilla and urban warfare and logistics, have been
involved in training Justice and Equality insurgents in Darfur. Al-Ahram has already noted connections:
“JEM also is suspected of having links with several militant Islamist groups in Africa and around the
world.” [15] It is also worth noting that amongst the rebels there is a self-styled “Tora Bora” militia – named
after the Afghan mountain range in which Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda and the Taliban fought one of their
last battles, and from which bin Laden escaped American capture. [16]
In another analogy with Afghanistan, blind western support for the Darfur rebels, and especially JEM – for
whatever short-term political reasons – runs the risk of repeating the mistake of building up Islamist
fundamentalist forces which then themselves pose national and regional threats to western interests.
Providing Afghan and Arab fundamentalists, amongst them a young Osama bin-Laden, with hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of military and logistical support in the 1980s has been seen as a tactical error
which led to the birth of the modern international terrorist movement we see today.
The possible al-Qaeda-Darfur connection is of concern to the United Nations. The Irish newspaper The
Sunday Tribune reported in December that “[t]he threat of al-Qaeda opening another front against western
aid organisations and personnel in Darfur is real, according to UN officials in Sudan”. A senior UN official
noted that Darfur rebels had already been made a specific threat to aid workers. According to The Sunday
Tribune: “It fitted the pattern of violence against western aid organisations and personnel in Afghanistan
and Iraq.” [17] The fundamentalist involvement has been poorly reported, but some details have emerged. In
July 2004, for example, a Saudi national said to have been “preaching holy war” within a refugee camp in
Chad was arrested. There had been violent scenes at the camp in which two refugees had been short dead
by local security forces. Arms caches had also been seized in the camp. [18]
It is worth noting that the pattern of terrorism in Darfur has echoed al-Qaeda and extemist tactics in Iraq,
especially with regard to attacks on policemen and police stations. [19] Over 400 policemen have been
murdered, and hundreds more wounded, in terrorist attacks on policemen in Darfur. The United Nations
Secretary-General noted in his October 2004 report to the Security Council that Darfur rebels had attacked
a police station in Medo, in North Darfur, on 12 September 2004 and that “further SLA attacks on police
posts were reported on 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 22 September. Further SLA attacks on police in Ghubayash
village, Western Kordofan, in the last week of September indicates that these violations may not remain
confined to Darfur.” [20] The Secretary-General’s November report noted the “SLA reportedly attacked police
posts nine times in October, killing at least nine policemen.” [21] European Union military observers mission
have confirmed rebel attacks on policemen in Darfur: “The SLA has been attacking continuously police
stations.” [22] These are just a few examples of UN reports of attacks on policemen in Darfur. The African
Union has also confirmed that “innocent policemen” have been the “major victims” of the rebels. [23] Knight
Ridder has also confirmed rebel attacks on police stations. [24] Human Rights Watch has reported: “Rebels
have attacked many police stations and posts in Darfur.” [25] These attacks are of deep concern for at least two
reasons. Firstly, as agreed with the United Nations, and outlined in the joint government-UN action plan,
the deployment of police forces within Darfur was to protect displaced people and displaced peoples’
camps from attack by criminal elements, Janjaweed or otherwise. Attacks on police stations, therefore, fuel
civilian insecurity in the region. Secondly, Darfur rebel attacks on policemen have not only mirrored
attacks in Iraq, but have also been part of a pattern of similar attacks on police stations within the Sahel.
Almost identical sorts of attacks to those in Iraq and Darfur have occurred as far apart as northern Nigeria
and Liberia. [26] This pattern of attacks also begs a simple question. Why is the murder of hundreds of poorly
armed policemen in Iraq deemed to be terrorism by the United States – with all the consequences of that
definition – while the murder of hundreds of poorly-armed policemen in Darfur appears not to be terrorism
by the American government? Disturbingly, it would seem that the United States is actually helping to fund
some of the activities of the very gunmen involved in killing the policemen – gunmen who if not
themselves Islamist extremists are nevertheless closely allied with the Justice and Equality Movement. [27]
The involvement of foreign governments such as Eritrea, and foreign terrorist networks, in encouraging the
destabilisation of Darfur, and their support for, and arming of, insurgents is very serious. Any attempts to
stop the war by seeking to address any marginalisation or underdevelopment – if that was ever the
motivation for the violence – will cut no ice with these forces.
Footnotes
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