Sudan in 2002 is on the brink of peace. There
are constitutional and political offers on the negotiating
table, up to and including an internationally-monitored referendum
on southern Sudan's status, that address the issues central
to the Sudanese conflict. The former Prime Minister and rebel
leader, Sadiq al-Mahdi, has also declared, for example, that:
"There are now circumstances and developments which could
favour an agreement on a comprehensive political solution."(1)
One of the constant impediments to the Sudanese peace process
has, however, been American policy towards Sudan, policy
based on self-evidently inaccurate images of Sudan. The
culmination of this policy was President Bush's signing
into law of the "Sudan Peace Act" on 21 October
2002. A more explicit example of confused, distorted and
poorly-informed legislation would be hard to find. It is
an Act that while paying lip service to the need for a "negotiated,
peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan" at the same
time provides one side to the conflict with hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of logistical assistance, assistance
that will be diverted to sustain gunmen and acquire weapons.
It is an Act that decries the manipulation of food aid while
ignoring the fact that the side it is supporting has been
accused of diverting two-thirds of foreign assistance within
the areas it controls. It is also an act which decries the
abuse of human rights within Sudan but provides hundreds
of
millions of dollars to those accused of appalling human
rights abuses in Sudan.
This legislation seeks to continue foreign interference
in a conflict that has raged since 1955, fought, in its
most recent phase, since 1983 between the Khartoum government
and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) led by John
Garang. Even a brief examination of attempts to achieve
a comprehensive solution to the conflict in Sudan and relief
efforts within that country reveal the deep flaws within
this legislation. It comes into force just in time to hinder
the significant progress made during the Machakos peace
talks this year. In so doing it follows a pattern of American
interference at key times during the peaceprocess. (In 1997,
for example, the United States government derailed a pivotal
round of peace talks due to discuss the Khartoum government's
offer of a referendum on southern Sudanese self-determination
by imposing comprehensive economic sanctions on Sudan -
thus purposefully strengthening the SPLA's position, leading
them to ignore the offer and continue the war.)
In addition to presenting a hopelessly unbalanced perspective
on Sudan, for example, the "Sudan Peace Act" authorises
the appropriation of $100 million for each of the fiscal
years 2003, 2004 and 2005 for "assistance" to
areas of Sudan outside government control, that is to say
those areas of Sudan controlled by the Sudan People's Liberation
Army (SPLA).
The Act also mandates that the U.S. President to "certify"
within six months of enactment, and each 6 months thereafter,
that the Sudanese government and the SPLA are negotiating
in "good faith" and that the negotiations should
continue. If the Sudanese government is deemed by the American
government not to have acted in "good faith",
the U.S. President is then expected to implement the following
measures: seek a UN Security Council arms embargo on the
Sudanese government; instruct American officials to actively
oppose any loans, credits or guarantees for Sudan from international
financial institutions; deny Sudan access to oil revenues
and downgrade or suspend diplomatic relations.
It should be noted in any examination of the "Sudan
Peace Act" that the track record of the United States
government and Congress on peace in Sudan has been appalling.
In any examination of the search for a
"negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan",
a little should be said first about those people who drafted
the Act. The Act was drafted by legislators such as Representatives
Tancredo, Wolf and Payne and Senators Frist, Brownback and
Feingold, whose previous involvement with Sudan had resulted
in an escalation in the Sudanese conflict and regional tensions.
In April 2001, former United States President Carter, a
Nobel Peace Laureate and one of the most respected and objective
commentators on events within Sudan, said of this period:
"For the last eight years, the U.S. has had a policy
which I strongly disagree with in Sudan, supporting the
revolutionary movement and not working for an overall peace
settlement." (2) This echoed earlier concerns voiced
by Carter. In December 1999 he had observed:
"The people in Sudan want to resolve the conflict.
The biggest obstacle is US government policy. The US is
committed to overthrowing the government in Khartoum. Any
sort of peace effort is aborted, basically by policies of
the United States...Instead of working for peace in Sudan,
the US government has basically promoted a continuation
of the war." (3)
It is clear, then, that these legislators are hardly the
best qualified group of people to talk about peace in Sudan.
Far from working for peace they have stood by while the
United States militarily and economically destabilised the
largest country in Africa. They helped shape American Sudan
policy from 1993 onwards - precisely the period referred
to by Carter. While they publicly lament the numbers of
deaths during this conflict, they are themselves directly
responsible for the deaths through war, starvation or disease
of thousands of Sudanese. Far from taking Carter's concerns
into consideration, the "Sudan Peace Act" merely
perpetuates the Clinton Administration's failed and farcical
Sudan policies. The United States Congress has shown itself
either amazingly naïve or blatantly hypocritical in
drafting the "Sudan Peace Act".
This American attitude was all the more regrettable since
the Sudanese government has repeatedly invited constructive
United States involvement within Sudan.(4)
Assistance to the SPLA
For all the self-righteous posturing by the drafters of
this legislation, the primary concern must be the effect
this Act will have on the SPLA's willingness to negotiate
peace.
It is precisely this sort of political and financial support
that has previously prolonged the Sudanese conflict. Former
President Carter, who has been involved in Sudanese issues
for two decades, observed of previous American political
and financial assistance, that: "I think [SPLA leader
John] Garang now feels he doesn't need to negotiate because
he anticipates a victory brought about by increasing support
from his immediate neighbors, and also from the United States
and indirectly from other countries". In 2000 and 2001,
the United States Congress voted millions of dollars worth
of assistance to Sudanese rebels.(5) The "Sudan Peace
Act" is a continuation of this policy. It will merely
reinforce SPLA intransigence with regard to peace talks.
Receiving
hundreds of millions of dollars a year from the United States,
most of which will be diverted to sustain any military capacity,
is a marked disincentive for the SPLA to negotiate in good
faith. Added to this, the SPLA (and more importantly those
American groups and agencies supporting the SPLA) will also
realise that any lack of progress in the peace talks due
to SPLA intransigence can be presented by their well-oiled
propaganda machine as being the government's fault - which
in turn will trigger the other American measures outlined
in the "Sudan Peace Act".
There is no doubt that any American aid will be largely
diverted by the SPLA to sustain itself and its military
effort. The "Sudan Peace Act" states and restates
concern about the facilitation of relief efforts within
southern Sudan. The Act is also hostile to the United Nations-
administered Operation Lifeline Sudan. It further repeatedly
refers to the manipulation of food aid by the government
of Sudan. Whatever the veracity of the claims about the
Sudanese authorities, what the Act conveniently ignores
is that the SPLA, the organisation it seeks to logistically
assist, and to whom it wishes to make access to relief aid
easier, has been the biggest abuser of relief aid in this
conflict. The human rights group, African Rights, for example,
has clearly stated that: "On the whole, SPLA commanders
and officials of the Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association
(SRRA, its humanitarian wing), have seen relief flows as
simple flows of material resources. The leadership has also
used aid for diplomatic and propaganda purposes."(6)
Despite stated concerns about the manipulation of aid, this
did not feature in the Act. The Roman Catholic Bishop of
the rebel-controlled diocese of Rumbek, Monsignor Caesar
Mazzolari, stated that the SPLA were diverting 65 percent
of the assistance going into rebel-held areas of southern
Sudan, even at the height of starvation in southern Sudan.
Agence France Presse also reported that: "Much of the
relief food going to more than a million famine victims
in rebel-held areas of southern Sudan is ending up in the
hands of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), relief
workers said."(7)
It is also clear that the American assistance envisaged
in the Act will be distributed by groups outside the framework
of the neutral Operation Lifeline Sudan. The often questionable
nature of this sort of non-OLS "humanitarian"
assistance to Sudan has already been documented. The American
government, for example, has given millions of dollars in
funding to Norwegian People's Aid (NPA), a non-governmental
organisation active in southern Sudan. A November 1999 Norwegian
television documentary, entitled 'Weapons Smuggling in Sudan',
has highlighted the role played by NPA in logistically and
politically perpetuating the Sudanese civil war.(8) There
had always been considerable speculation as to whether NPA
was militarily involved with the SPLA. This
documentary confirmed that the NPA has for several years
organised an air-bridge for the supply of weapons to battle
zones within Sudan. One of the NPA pilots involved in the
gun running stated that on one occasion his plane had landed
at SPLA bases with some 2.5 tonnes of weapons. It was stated
that Norwegian People's Aid had flown between 80 - 100 tonnes
of weapons into Sudan in aeroplanes supposedly carrying
humanitarian assistance. Among the tonnes of weapons flown
into Sudan were landmines. The documentary also placed on
record other clear evidence of NPA military involvement
with the SPLA. Norwegian People's Aid openly states that
"[a] major contributor to our programme in Sudan, is
the USAID".(9) This is the sort of organisation that
the "Sudan Peace Act" envisages channelling "relief"
in southern Sudan rather than the neutral and accountable
UN mechanisms.
SPLA: A Commitment to Peace?
Given that the legislation is so supportive of the SPLA
it is important to examine the SPLA position on peace. It
is clear that the SPLA has been an obstacle to peace in
Sudan. This is perhaps best illustrated by John Garang's
statement, for example, regarding the SPLA's participation
in the crucial November 1997 round of IGAD peace talks in
Nairobi (the first meeting after the government's historic
offer of an internationally-monitored referendum on self-determination)
that "[w]e intended not to reach an agreement with
the [Sudanese government]. This is what we did and we succeeded
in it because we did not reach an agreement." (10)
There is clearly growing frustration within the international
community at the SPLA's intransigence. This frustration
has been highlighted as a result of the positive shift in
international opinion with regard to Sudan. The United Nations,
for example, has pointedly called upon the SPLA to accept
Khartoum's offers of cease-fire.(11) In September 2001,
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights in
the Sudan observed that: "sources...pointed out that
among most of SPLM/A leaders there is no serious commitment
to peace".(12)
The SPLA's apparent reluctance to seriously negotiate a
peaceful resolution to the conflict is a matter of record.
The SPLA has waged war since 1983 against several governments
in Khartoum - military, transitional and democratic - and
repeated attempts at a negotiated resolution of the conflict
have failed. While it is true that several governments came
and went in the 1980s - there were six coalition governments
during Sadiq al-Mahdi's tenure alone - the same government
has now been in power in Sudan since 1989. The SPLA has
constantly
changed the conditions it has set for ending the war and
negotiating. In the 1980s it demanded that Sudan's military
pacts with other countries be abrogated, that Nimeiri's
September 1983 sharia laws be repealed and
that there should be a national constitutional conference.
Sudan's military pacts have been dropped, in 1991 the government
exempted southern Sudan from sharia law and the Libyan-Egyptian
initiative envisages a national dialogue conference. Yet
the war continues, SPLA demands change and peace talks falter.
John Garang's disdain for the Sudanese peace process has
also been illustrated by his launching of large-scale offensives
often one or two days before, or on the same day as, regionally
brokered peace talks. On one occasion, thirty minutes before
the June 2001 peace summit was due to be held in Nairobi,
the SPLA faxed a statement to Associated Press stating that
its forces had captured the southern town of Raga, declaring
"this is excellent timing".(13) Similarly, during
the September 2000 IGAD peace talks, the SPLA escalated
its military
activity claiming to have inflicted "heavy loss of
life and equipment" on government forces and to have
captured the garrison town of Tahajulbolis.(14) Similar
activity also disrupted the 2002 Machakos peace talks.
Speaking out in May 2000, prominent southern Sudanese leader
BonaMalwal, a former culture and information minister, and
publisher of the opposition Sudan Democratic Gazette, wrote
to John Garang stating "I have noticed and revealed
the duplicity with which you have participated in the peace
process. Many Southerners have spoken for some time about
the need to arrive at a Southern consensus over the question
of Self-Determination. They recognise the need to fill the
vacuum created by your vague goals for the war of liberation.
After seventeen years of this bloody war in which two million
of our people have perished, the Northern Sudanese political
establishment as a whole has said that they would negotiate
a political agreement with you to work out the modalities
for a referendum on self-determination for the South. Yet,
you have personally dodged this issue - as seen in the way
you have briefed your delegations to the various rounds
of the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD)
peace talks....Perhaps your own tactics make you blind to
this, but there is indeed increasing support among the Southern
Sudanese people for pursuing peace, if peace is pursued
honestly, diligently and in good faith by the other side.
How many more millions of Southern Sudanese do you want
to die to satisfy your ego?"(15) Much of this SPLA
intransigence can be laid at the feet of the United States
Government and Congress.
The "Sudan Peace Act" is riddled with blatant
dishonesty. While professing a concern for human rights,
the Act provides hundreds of millions of dollars in assistance
to an organisation with an appalling human rights record.
In November 1999, for example, eight reputable US-based
humanitarian organisations working in Sudan, groups such
as CARE, World Vision, Church World Service and Save the
Children, no friends of the Sudanese government, publicly
stated that the SPLA has: "engaged for years in the
most serious human rights abuses, including extrajudicial
killings, beatings, arbitrary detention, slavery, etc."(16)
In December 1999, Human Rights Watch stated that: "The
SPLA has a history of gross abuses of human rights and has
not made any effort to establish accountability. Its abuses
today remain serious".(17)
The 'New York Times', another outspoken critic of the Khartoum
government, has described the SPLA as "brutal and predatory...an
occupying army, killing, raping and pillaging". It
is ironic that the "Sudan Peace Act" also contains
a section dealing with "the investigation of war criminals"
given that the same Act provides the SPLA, a group clearly
guilty of involvement in war crimes, with hundreds of millions
of dollars worth of American tax-payers money. The 'New
York Times', for example, has stated that SPLA leader John
Garang is one of Sudan's "preeminent war criminals".(18).
The U.S. Congress cannot have been unaware of this appalling
human rights record. American Sudan specialist John Prendergast,
who served with both the National Security Council and State
Department, and who has briefed many of these legislators,
has, for example, stated on record that the SPLA "was
responsible for egregious human rights violations in the
territory it controlled".(19) Prendergast also personally
placed on record that: "The SPLA has faced a tidal
wave of accusations and condemnation from
international human rights organizations and local churches
over its human rights record." (20)
It is unsurprising that the "Sudan Peace Act"
is as skewed as it is given the sorts of views held by those
legislators who helped to draft it. Their prejudice and
ignorance regarding Sudan is clear. This was clearly illustrated
in the Congressional debate which followed the enacting
of the Bill. In a generalised reference Representative Smith
referred to Sudan as "a brutal dictatorship".
Yet, only a few months earlier, somewhat more objective
and independent reporting by Associated Press stated that
"Sudan has come a long way...the changes in this country...are
too sweeping and popular to be rolled back. Human Rights
and civil society groups operate openly. Press censorship
has been lifted and independent newspapers freely criticize
government
policies."(21)
Several other representatives cited severe religious persecution.
Representative Bachus of Alabama, for example, claimed "(T)oday
in Sudan people are given a simple choice. They are either
told to embrace the
state-sponsored faith or die. That is the choice."
New Jersey Representative Payne similarly claimed that "religion...is
a major factor" in the Sudanese conflict. While obviously
successful as a propaganda projection, especially within
the Washington Beltway, the simple fact is that the Sudanese
conflict is about constitutional and political changes within
southern Sudan. Even the Congressionally-funded U.S. Commission
on International Religious Freedom has confirmed that the
largely non-Muslim southern Sudan was exempt from Islamic
sharia
law.(22) The British Government, for example, responding
to a question in parliament about religion in Sudan, stated
in 2001: "Sharia law is by and large not imposed on
mainly Christian areas such as south Sudan,
although there are federal laws which infringe on religious
freedom (e.g. Islamic banking system)".(23) It should
also be noted that in November 2001, the United Nations
Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the
Sudan noted that "all counterparts I meet concurred
with the view that there is no religious persecution as
such" in Sudan.(24) He also noted that: "church
interlocutors almost unanimously share the general opinion
that the war has no religious motivation...".(25) The
'New York Times' would seem to have confirmed these views,
reporting that "Khartoum's churches on Sunday are filled
to overflowing with Christians, worshipping freely, and
those congregations are growing. One measure of the strength
of Christianity here is that in recent years Catholic priests
have been performing more than 7,000 baptisms of newborns
every Easter, church officials said...In dozens of interviews,
Christians acknowledged they do not face overt oppression.
By and large they are free to go where they please and to
worship at the existing churches."(26) The newspaper
also quoted a Catholic priest as saying "It is difficult
to say there is direct persecution".
The conflict has always been about the political status
of southern Sudan. While the SPLA appear to be confused,
the Khartoum authorities' approach would appear to be clear.
If the SPLA are fighting for autonomy
or even separation this has already been offered by the
government. In 1997, having already introduced a federal
system and exempted southern Sudan from Sharia law, the
Sudanese Government, in the Khartoum Peace
Agreement, also offered, amongst other things, the holding
of a free and fair, internationally-supervised, referendum
in which the people of southern Sudan could, for the first
time ever, choose whether to remain
as a part of Sudan or to become independent. This offer
has also been written into the 1998 Constitution, and repeated
on several occasions (27), most recently during the June
2001 peace talks in Nairobi.(28) It is an offer that has
also been acknowledged by the SPLA.(29)
The Sudanese government has repeatedly offered a comprehensive
ceasefire.(30) In April and May 2000, Khartoum once more
declared its readiness to enter into "an immediate
and comprehensive ceasefire" and
to restart negotiations for the achievement of a comprehensive
peace: it called upon the SPLA to do the same.(31) Throughout
2001 and 2002, the Sudanese government called for a peaceful
resolution of the conflict.
Khartoum appears to have sought out every possible peace
forum. (32) The Sudanese government has also repeatedly
requested international assistance in securing a peaceful
end to the conflict.(33) It is difficult to see how much
further towards a comprehensive solution the Sudanese government
can go. The SPLA's inability to articulate what they are
fighting for is echoed in its approach to the peace process.
In erratic shifts in position, the SPLA has both accepted
and then refused regional attempts at peace-making, sometimes
within the space of 48 hours.(34)
Sudanese Foreign Minister Mustafa Osman Ismail accuses
the United States of pursuing a policy that prolongs the
Sudanese war: "Your [i.e. the US] policy will not lead
to peace. It will lead to the continuation of war, the suffering
of the people, the loss of lives in the south ... This war,
this problem, will not be settled by fighting. It has to
be settled by political means. The government of Sudan is
ready for that".(35) America's provocative acts take
place at a time when the there have been significant positive
political changes within Sudan itself. The former Prime
Minister, Sadiq al-Mahdi, himself ousted in 1989 by the
present government, and a pivotal rebel leader, was quoted
by an April 2001 American fact-finding mission as saying
that: "the United States has
been an obstacle to peace in Sudan and also to unity among
the opposition. The United States' policy has been a problem.
He said that Sudan is like a pregnant woman that is about
to deliver and needs a midwife to help the delivery. They
all believe that the United States could act as a midwife.
They all accept this. But, the United States, instead of
helping deliver the baby, killed it..." The "Sudan
Peace Act" continues this process.
Humanitarian Assistance to Sudan: Operation Lifeline Sudan
The Act also seeks to by-pass the neutral Operation Lifeline
Sudan structures. We already have a clear indication of
what this would entail. In February 2000, because of unacceptable
demands made upon them
by the SPLA, eleven international non-governmental aid organisations
were forced to leave southern Sudan. These NGOs included
CARE, Oxfam, Save the Children and Medecins Sans Frontieres.
The SPLA had demanded that all aid agencies active in southern
Sudan sign a memorandum which dictated SPLA control over
their activities, and aid distribution, as well as which
Sudanese nationals the agencies employed, and which
stipulated a swath of "taxes" and charges for
working in southern Sudan. The NGOs involved handled about
75 percent of the humanitarian aid entering southern Sudan.(36)
The withdrawal of these NGOS directly affected US$ 40 million
worth of aid programs.(37) The expelled aid agencies stated
that one million southern Sudanese were at risk as a result
of the SPLA's decision to expel the NGOs.(38) The European
Union described the SPLA demands as a serious violation
of humanitarian law and suspended its substantial aid program
to rebel-controlled areas.(39) One can only imagine the
uproar within Congress had the Sudanese government cut the
provision of humanitarian aid to southern Sudan by 75 percent.
Such behaviour by the SPLA does not even rate a mention
by Congress. Not only has the SPLA severely restricted humanitarianoutreach
within southern Sudan for political reasons, but the "Sudan
Peace Act" makes it even easier for the SPLA to engage
in massive food
aid diversion.
Conclusion
The flaws of the "Sudan Peace Act" are there
for all to see. The Act is characterised by cynicism, misinformation
and double standards. Worse still it will make a peaceful
solution of Sudan's long-running conflict
that much more difficult. The most constructive role that
the U.S. Congress could play with regard to the Sudanese
conflict would be to bring the SPLA to the negotiating table.
Far from doing this, however, Congress has sought to provide
the SPLA, a group without an identifiable political objective,
with hundreds of millions of dollars in support - dramatically
reducing that group's inclination to negotiate in good faith
and in effect encouraging further conflict. There are other
contradictions. While professing deep concern about relief
delivery in southern Sudan, for example, the Act ignores
the fact that the group it is sponsoring has been guilty
of diverting two-thirds of all relief going into the areas
it controls, was responsible for a suspension of 75 percent
of humanitarian projects in southern Sudan by insisting
on SPLA control of the relief aid, and has repeatedly launched
offensives within areas that are already seriously famine
and drought affected. The Act claims to be concerned about
war crimes and yet actively seeks to sustain some of the
conflict's worst abusers of human rights.
The image of the United States can only but suffer as the
result of this Act. It would appear that a group of legislators
who are at best naïve and at worst dogmatic religious
fanatics, are at present driving America's Sudan policy.
In so doing they damage the reputation of the United States
within the international community.
Notes
1 "Developments in Sudan Favour National Reconciliation:
Mahdi", News Article by Agence France Presse, 25 December
1999. See, for example, "Opposition Leader Predicts
Solution to Sudan's Conflict", News Article by PANA,
27 March 2000; "Sudanese Rebel Group to Enter Khartoum
Politics", News Article by Agence France Presse, 20
March 2000; and "Mahdi's Withdrawal Dents Opposition
Alliance", News Article by PANA, 25
March, 2000.
2 "Carter Says Wrong Time for Mideast Talks",
News Article by Reuters, 24 April 2001.
3 "Carter, Others Say US Has Faltered in Africa",
'The Boston Globe', 8 December 1999. For more details of
American support to the SPLA see "Ex-President Opposes
Policy of Aiding Khartoum's Foes", The Washington Times,
25 September 1997; "Sudan's American-aided guerrillas",
'The Economist', 25 January 1997; "Sudan Accuses US
of Supplying Rebels with Mines", News Article by Xinhua,
21 January 1999; "US flies in howitzers to subdue Sudan",
'Africa Analysis', No 290, 6 February 1998; "Albright
Meets Sudan Rebels, Pledges US Support", News Article
by Reuters, 10 December 1997; "U.S. said to promise
aid to Sudanese rebel areas", News Article by Reuters,
2 June 1998.
4 See, for example, amongst many overtures: "Interview
- Sudan Wants to Bury Hatchet with US", News Article
by Reuters, 20 May 1999; "Sudan Wants Dialogue With
US, Bashir Tells Envoy", News Article by Reuters, 7
March 2000; "Sudan Wants Better Ties with US's Bush",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 2 February 2001 and
"Sudan Welcomes U.S. Peace Involvement but Urges Neutrality",
News Article by Associated Press, 28 May 2001.
5 See, for example, "U.S. House Backs Efforts to Aid
Sudan", News Article by Reuters, 13 June 2001; "Sudanese
Rebels to Receive Dlrs 3 Million in Assistance", News
Article by Associated Press, 25 May 2001,
and "U.S. Slates $3 Million for Sudan's Opposition",
'The Washington Post', 25 May 2001.
6 Alex de Waal (Editor), 'Food and Power in Sudan', African
Rights, London, 1997, pp.5,7.
7 "Aid for Sudan Ending Up With SPLA: Relief Workers",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 21 July, 1998.
8 Vapensmuglerne I Sudan, 'Brennpunkt', NRK Television,
Norway, 17 November 1999.
9 See, for example, the Norwegian People's Aid website
at http://www.npaid.org/about_npa/funding.html
10 Summary of World Broadcasts, BBC, 15 December 1997.
11 See, for example, "Annan Calls on Sudan's SPLM
Leader to Sign Ceasefire", News Article by Agence France
Presse, 7 August 1999.
12 'Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan', UN Special
Rapporteur Gerhart Baum, United Nations General Assembly,
New York, A/56/150, 7 September 2001.
13 "Sudan's Government Calls On International Community
to Push for Cease-Fire", News Article by Associated
Press, 5 June 2001.
14 "Sudan: Peace Talks Continue While SPLA Claim
New Victory", UN Integrated Regional Information Network,
Nairobi, 29 September 2000.
15 Bona Malwal, "Open Letter to John Garang from Bona
Malwal", 'Sudan Democratic Gazette', May 2000.
16 "Humanitarian Organizations Oppose Plan Providing
Food to Sudanese Rebels", Press Release by InterAction,
the American Council for Voluntary International Action,
Washington-DC, 30 November, 1999.
17 "Rights Group Warns US Against Feeding Sudan Rebels",
News Article by Reuters on 14 December, 1999.
18 "Misguided Relief to Sudan", Editorial, 'The
New York Times', 6 December 1999.
19 John Prendergast, 'Crisis Response: Humanitarian Band-Aids
in Sudan and Somalia', Pluto Press, London, 1997, p.77.
20 Ibid, p.72.
21 "Seeking Friends in the West, Sudan Tempers its
Islamic Zeal", News Article by Associated Press, 13
July 2002.
22 A significant example of Khartoum's effort to accommodate
the interests of Sudan's non-Muslim southerners was the
1991 exemption of the largely non-Muslim southern Sudan
from sharia law. Even the Clinton Administration has had
to admit that sharia law was not applied in the south. The
American State Department's 'Sudan Country Report on Human
Rights Practices', for example, has stated: "Sudan's
1991 Criminal Act,
based on Shari'a law, (prescribes) specific "hudud"
punishments. The Government officially exempts the 10 Southern
States, whose population is mostly non-Muslim, from parts
of the 1991 Criminal Act. But the Act
permits the possible future application of Shari'a law in
the south, if the local state assemblies so decide."
(See, 'Sudan Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1995', Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, United
States Department of State, Washington-DC, February 1996.)
23 House of Commons Hansard Written Answers, 18 October
2001.
24 The Speech of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation
of Human Rights in the Sudan delivered to the Third Committee
of the General Assembly, 8 November 2001, New York.
25 'Situation of Human Rights in the Sudan', UN Special
Rapporteur Gerhart Baum, United Nations General Assembly,
New York, A/56/150, 7 September 2001.
26 "Christians Face Difficulties in Arab Khartoum",
'The New York Times', 5 April 1998.
27 See, "Sudan offers South secession", News
Article by BBC, 22 February 1999; "Southern secession
better than more war: Sudan's President", News Article
by Agence France Presse, 22 February 1999; "Sudan Says
Happy for South to Secede", News Article by Reuters,
7 May 1998.
28 "Khartoum Urges Rebels to 'Stop Fighting and Talk'",
News Article by Agence France Presse 5 June 2001
29 See, "Referendum agreed at Sudan peace talks",
News Article by BBC World on 7 May 1998, and "SPLA
plays down deal on Referendum in southern Sudan", News
Article by BBC, 7 May 1998.
30 See, "Sudanese government declares ceasefire",
News Article by BBC World, 5 August 1999; "Sudanese
government declares comprehensive ceasefire", News
Article by Associated Press, 5 August 1999; "Sudan
Government to Observe Ceasefire Despite SPLA Rejection",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 August 1999;"EU
Welcomes Cease-Fire in Sudan", News Article by Xinhua,
20 August 1999; "Annan welcomes ceasefire", News
Article by UN Integrated Regional Information Network, 11
August 1999; "Annan hails Sudan cease-fire allowing
aid to flow", News Article by Reuters, 6 August 1999;
"Annan calls on Sudan's SPLM leader to sign ceasefire",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 7 August 1999; "Sudanese
rebels reject peace plan", News Article by BBC World,
30 August 1999; "Sudanese Rebels Reject Government
Cease-Fire", News
Article by Reuters, 5 August 1999.
31 See, for example, "Sudan's Government in Favour
of Ceasefire in 18-year Civil War", News Article by
Agence France Presse, 22 April 2001 and "Government
"Ready for a Ceasefire", News Article by United
Nations
Integrated Regional Information Network, 15 May 2001.
32 "Sudan Backs Combination of Arab and African Peace
Drives", News Article by Agence France Presse, 24 October
1999.
33 See, for example, "Sudan calls for Western Pressure
on southern Rebels to Accept Ceasefire", News Article
by Agence France Presse, 26 April 2000; 'US Catholic Clerics
Urged to Pressurise Garang into Accepting Cease-Fire', News
Article by Sudan News Agency, 27 March 2001; "Britain
Can Pressurize Rebels to Realize Cease-Fire, Sudanese Diplomat",
News Article by SUNA, 26 February 2001; "Sudanese Government
Welcomes Carter's Initiative to End the War in southern
Sudan", News Article by ArabicNews.com, 26 April 2001.
34 See, "Sudanese Rebels Reject Peace Plan",
News Article by BBC News Online Network, 30 August 1999;
"Sudanese Rebels Snub Libyan- Egyptian Mediation Effort",
News Article by Agence France Presse, 30 August 1999; "Sudanese
Rebel Leader Supports Peace Plan: Egypt", News Article
by Agence France Presse, 31 August 1999; and "Sudanese
Rebels Say They Can't Commit to Egyptian-Libyan Peace Drive",
News Article by
Agence France Presse, 14 May 2001; "Sudanese Rebels
Reject Reconciliation Accord", News Article by Associated
Press, 29 November 1999.
35 "Interview - Sudan Says US Harming Peace Prospects",
News Article by Reuters, 25 October 1999.
36 "Rights Group Urges More Talks on Sudan Relief",
News Article by Associated Press, 8 March 2000.
37 "Seven Aid Agencies Urge Renewed Negotiations for
Relief to Southern Sudan", News Article by Associated
Press, 1 March 2000.
38 "Expelled Aid Agencies Say Million at Risk in Sudan",
News Article by Reuters on 1 March 2000.
39 "European Commission Statement on Southern Sudan",
Statement by European Union, 29 February 2000.
