Sudan is clearly a Muslim country, with Muslims
making up well over 75 percent of the population (1), and
the government that has been in power in Sudan since 1989
has consciously based its administration on Islamic values.
Michael Field's 'Inside the Arab World' states that Sudan
post-1989 is unique amongst Islamic polities: "The only
Arab country that has put into effect modern, republican,
Islamist ideas has been Sudan". (2) While Sudan has been
misrepresented as a theocratic, Islamic fundamentalist state,
the Sudan's Islamic experience is different from the Saudi
Arabian experience and very different from the Islamic model
in Iran.
The present broadly Islamist government headed by Omer al-Bashir
has followed, and significantly reformed, the previously
existing Islamic model since its introduction by President
Nimeiri in 1983 and its continuation under Prime Minister
Sadiq al-Mahdi. The 1998 Constitution, introduced by the
present government, emphasises that political authority
can never be the divine right of an individual, family or
group of people, and that religion cannot be used as a means
of differentiating between citizens of the state. It is
also a matter of record, for example, that the present government
removed southern Sudan from Islamic sharia law, as Islam,
along with Christianity, is a minority faith in southern
Sudan. Islamic, sharia, law is only applicable in northern
Sudan. As things stand, it is the right of the legislature
of each state within Sudan to choose the nature of the laws,
religious or otherwise, under which they wish to be governed.
So it is theoretically possible for a northern state to
opt out of sharia law and it is theoretically possible for
a southern state, if it so chooses, to adopt sharia law.
The desire of the majority of Muslims in Sudan to live within
a society guided by Islamic law would appear to be a clear
one, and is no different from a number of other Muslim societies.
All three of the major political parties in northern Sudan,
the Umma Party, the Democratic Unionist Party and the National
Congress are ultimately all Islamic in orientation.
The British colonial authorities realised very early on
that Islam was a vital part of Sudanese society, and it
was the colonial government which first structured Sudan
Islamically in legislative and legal fields. In 1902 an
Islamic Law Courts Ordinance was promulgated, providing
for a Court of Appeal, High Courts and ordinary courts,
and this remained on the statute book, virtually unchanged,
throughout the Condominium. A training school for sharia
judges was begun at Gordon College in Khartoum. (3) Sudanese
academic Abdelwahab El-Affendi noted the effect of British
policies: "It is ironic that the early stirrings of the
Islamic revival in Sudan were conditioned by the British
policy which favoured ulama and the expansion of Islamic
education The main motive force behind the early rumblings
of the revival was another product of British policy, the
Shariah section of the Gordon Memorial College, which taught
potential judges religious subjects along reformist lines
This was the explosive formula that produced the new generation
of Islamic activists everywhere." (4)
Sudan's 1998 Constitution states that the sources of legislation
within Sudan are derived from Islamic law and customary
law as well as the consensus of the nation as derived at
through referendum. The official position in respect of
freedom of religion within Sudan is clear. Article 24 of
the 1998 Constitution of the Republic of the Sudan states:
"Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience and religion
and the right to manifest and disseminate his religion or
belief in teaching, practice or observance. No one shall
be coerced to profess a faith in which he does not believe
or perform rituals or worship that he does not voluntarily
accept." Article 90 stipulates that the President of the
Republic cannot issue decrees affecting freedom of religion.
The 1998 Constitution differs from earlier Sudanese constitutions:
the 1958 constitution had declared Islam to be "the official
religion of the state"; the 1973 constitution stated "In
the democratic republic of the Sudan the religion is Islam."
In addition to not specifying the religion of the state,
the 1998 Constitution also renders rights according to citizenship
and not religion, prohibiting the use of religion to usurp
rights or to secure gain. There are no religious criteria
for elected public office. This built on previous Constitutional
decrees, which, while affirming that "Islam is the guiding
religion for the overwhelming majority of the Sudanese people",
stated that "revealed religions such as Christianity, or
traditional religious beliefs may be freely adopted by anyone
with no coercion in regards to beliefs and no restriction
on religious observances. These principles are observed
by the State and its laws". (5) In northern Sudan Friday
is the day of worship for Muslims; it is also a day off
for Christians, who are also entitled to two hours off on
Sunday to attend prayers. In southern Sudan, Sunday is the
day of worship.
The liberal model of Islam in Sudan has also been remarked
upon by respected commentators such as the veteran American
journalist Milton Viorst. A 'New Yorker' columnist who has
covered the Middle East for twenty-five years, Viorst is
the author of 'Sandcastles: The Arabs in Search of the Modern
World'. Viorst has observed that "Sudan is the only state
in our age that has formally opted for Islam as its system
of government". He has also compared the Sudanese model
outlined by Dr Hasan Turabi, the Sudanese politician generally
seen to have been pivotal to the Sudanese experience, to
others in the region:
"By the standards of other Arab societies, Turabi's concept
of Islam is open-minded and tolerant. Though he sees no
reason to emulate Western liberalism, few would contradict
his assertion that "we do not advocate a very strict form
of Islam". The signs are plentiful, in a visit to Sudan,
that the Islam practiced there is less strict that that
of Egypt, to say nothing of Saudi Arabia. One scarcely sees
the hijab, the head-covering that makes many women in Egypt
appear so forbidding, much less the Saudi veil. Most Sudanese
reflected Turabi's preference for a genial, non-rigorous
Islam, more in keeping with Sudan's special experience within
the flow of Islamic history." (6)
Viorst has also interviewed the Sudanese head of state Omer
Bashir. President Bashir stated with regard to the Sudanese
model of Islam that:
"Not all groups agree on how we are interpreting the sharia,
but we believe there is wide latitude. We have chosen a
moderate way, like the Koran itself, and so the sharia in
Sudan will be moderate. The dispute over what it requires
lies not in the area of private but of public affairs. Unfortunately,
there is no model in history for Islamic government. Fourteen
centuries have gone by since the prophet, and everyone now
has his image of an Islamic state. Some countries confuse
traditions - like the suppression of women - with religion,
but tradition is not Islam." (7)
In his interview with Viorst, Turabi also outlined his concepts
of Islamic government and society:
"What would an Islamic Government mean?...The model is very
clear; the scope of government is limited. Law is not the
only agency of social control. Moral norms, individual conscience,
all these are very important, and they are autonomous. Intellectual
attitudes toward Islam are not going to be regulated or
codified at all. The presumption is that people are free.
The religious freedom not just of non-Muslims, but even
of Muslims who have different views, is going to be guaranteed.
I personally have views that run against all the orthodox
schools of law on the status of women, on the court testimony
of non-Muslims, on the law of apostasy. Some people say
that I have been influenced by the West and that I border
on apostasy myself...I don't accept the condemnation of
Salman Rushdie. If a Muslim wakes up in the morning and
says he doesn't believe any more, that's his business. There
has never been any question of inhibiting people's freedom
to express any understanding of Islam. The function of government
is not total." (8)
Respected Africa analyst and commentator Colin Legum has
defined some of the differences between Turabi and Islamic
fundamentalists:
"Turabi's policies are out of step with other Islamic fundamentalist
organisations on a number of important issues. For example,
he strongly opposes the idea of a Pan-Islamic movement,
which brought him into conflict with other (Muslim Brotherhood)
parties in Egypt and elsewhere. He insists that the Sudan
has its own national problems which require a particularist
approach.
One of Turabi's fundamental breaks with the strict Islamic
traditionalists is over the place of women in Muslim societies.
As a declared supporter of women's liberation, he insists
on their right of equality and their right to full membership
of the (Muslim Brotherhood), the only Islamic movement that
does so." (9)
Professor Tim Niblock is one of the foremost British authorities
on Islam and Sudan. He has pointed out two areas in which
Sudan's model differs from maintstream Islamist thought.
One is the Sudanese Islamists' "explicit acceptance of liberal
democracy as the appropriate form of political organisation
for Sudan. The advocacy of liberal democracy by the N.I.F.
went well beyond the stress which Islamist movements customarily
place on the need for shura (consultation)." Secondly, the
Sudanese model with regard to women is "qualitatively different
from that proposed in most Islamist programmes. The emphasis
is on women 'escaping from social oppression' and 'playing
a full part in building the new society', rather than on
their primary duty lying within the family". (10) This particular
liberal school of thought within Islam was also noted by
other outside observers. The United States government's
own publication 'Sudan: A Country Study' freely conceded
that "[t]he Islamic movement in Sudan", was "by no means
as militant as in other Arab countries". (11) Even 'The
New York Times', a source not noted for its affinity to
Islamic models of government, said of Turabi in 1996: "He
voices a tolerant version of political Islam - far less
conservative than Saudi Arabia's, far less militant than
Iran's". (12)
There is also no doubt that the Sudanese model is under
attack for its moderate interpretation of Islam. In February,
1994, for example, extremist gunmen opened fire in the al-Thwarah
mosque in Omdurman, Sudan. They killed nineteen people and
wounded twenty others. 'New African' magazine reported that
the Muslim extremists involved "showed that they did not
think that the government of General Omar Al-Bashir was
sufficiently fundamentalist for them. (13) The London-based
Arabic language newspaper 'Al-Sharq al-Awsat' has stated
with regard to the threat posed by Islamic extremists to
the Khartoum authorities, that the government: "Now...senses
that it is under threat from factions that can brook no
deviation from their hard-line interpretations of religion,
which are incompatible with the requirements and conditions
of political activity in any Muslim state on earth. Khartoum
has been describing them as 'religious fanatics'...certainly
the slaughtering of Muslims in a mosque, as occurred in
Sudan, is fanaticism. It is the same fanaticism whose effects
we can witness in Egypt and Algeria, regardless of the causes".
The newspaper concluded that "Sudan's government and people
stand in the same trench as the other countries who live
in fear of the extremist organisations". (14)
Significant sections of the Sudanese population follow traditional
African faiths and Christianity. Sudan's animists, constituting
perhaps one fifth of the population, are largely within
southern Sudanese communities. Christianity has deep roots
within Sudan, some going back into antiquity. (15) There
are active Christian communities in both the north and south
of the country, presenting several denominations. Christians
make up 4 percent of the national population, and perhaps
between 10-15 percent of the southern population. (16) There
are hundreds of churches, church schools and Christian centres
throughout Sudan. Sudanese Christians also play a full and
active part in their country's political and social life,
disproportionate to their numbers in society. A distinguished
Christian southern Sudanese academic, Professor Moses Machar,
is Vice-President. Christians serve as federal and state
ministers, governors, ambassadors, judges and senior army
and police officers. Dozens of Christians serve as members
of the National Assembly. A significant example of Khartoum's
effort to accommodate the interests of Sudan's non-Muslim
southerners was the 1991 exemption of the largely non-Muslim
southern Sudan from sharia law. (17)
It is clear that attempts to misrepresent Sudan and the
Sudanese experience do not reflect the reality of the situation
within the country. There is every difference between a
theocracy and the Sudanese experience. A theocracy would
assert infallibility, claiming to derive its authority from
a divine source. This is simply incompatible with the reality
of the modern state which derives its authority and mandate
from the people. In Sudan religion is seen as a source of
moral guidance, and cannot be used as a special advantage
for individuals, groups or members of any particular faith.
In Sudan authority would appear to be derived from the people
and not religious allegiance.
Notes
1 See, for example, 'Annual Report on International Religious
Freedom for 1999: Sudan', U.S. Department of State, Washington
DC, 9 September 1999.
2 Michael Field, 'Inside the Arab World', Harvard University
Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1994, p.257.
3 "Law in the Sudan Under the Anglo-Sudan Condominium" in
'The Condominium Remembered, Volume 1: The Making of the
Sudanese State', p.45.
4 Abdelwahab El-Affendi, 'Turabi's Revolution: Islam and
Power in Sudan', Grey Seal, London, 1991, pp.42-43.
5 'Principles, Regulations and Constitutional Developments
for 1993', Government of Sudan, Khartoum, 16 October 1993.
6 Milton Viorst, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment: Fundamentalism
in Power", 'Foreign Affairs', 1995, Volume 74, Number 3,
pp. 46-47.
7 Milton Viorst, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment: Fundamentalism
in Power", 'Foreign Affairs', 1995, Volume 74, Number 3,
pp. 52-53.
8 Milton Viorst, "Sudan's Islamic Experiment: Fundamentalism
in Power", 'Foreign Affairs', 1995, Volume 74, Number 3,
p. 53.
9 Colin Legum, "Struggle Over Sharia", 'New African', March
1992, p. 33.
10 Professor Tim Niblock, "Islamist Movements and Sudan's
Political Coherence", in Herve Bleuchot, Christian Delmet
and Derek Hopwood, (Editors), 'Sudan: History, Identity,
Ideologies', Ithaca Press, Reading, 1991, p. 265.
11 Harold D. Nelson (Editor), 'Sudan: A Country Study',
The American University and Department of the Army, Washington-DC,
1982.
12 New York Times Service, republished in 'International
Herald Tribune', 26 December 1996.
13 'New African', December, 1994, p. 14.
14 'Al-Sharq al-Awsat', London, 8 February
1994; See, also, a typical fundamentalist critique of Sudan's
Islamic model, "Sudan: When a State is Not an Islamic State?",
Khilafah, at http://www.Khilafah.org/graphics/pseudo/countries/issudan.html
15 The Sudan National Museum has as a key display one thousand
year-old Christian frescos relocated from northern Sudan
when the areas in which they had been found were flooded.
The Christian period within Sudan is well documented at
the museum.
16 There is a certain amount of divergence in respect of
estimates of the religious breakdown of the southern population.
Human Rights Watch states that 4 percent of the population
are Christian and that about 15 percent of southern Sudanese
are Christian (Testimony of Jemera Rone, Human Rights Watch,
Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Subcommittee
on Africa, 25 September 1997). The Economist Intelligence
Unit in its report entitled 'Sudan: Country Profile 1994-95'
also puts the Christian population of southern Sudan at
15 percent. The definitive United States government guide,
'Sudan - A Country Study', published by the Federal Research
division and Library of Congress, states that "In the early
1990s possibly no more than 10 percent of southern Sudan's
population was Christian." Muslims may make up a similar
percentage in southern Sudan.
17 The American State Department's 'Sudan Country Report
on Human Rights Practices', for example, has stated: "Sudan's
1991 Criminal Act, based on Shari'a law, (prescribes) specific
"hudud" punishments. The Government officially exempts the
10 Southern States, whose population is mostly non-Muslim,
from parts of the 1991 Criminal Act. But the Act
permits the possible future application of Shari'a law in
the south, if the local state assemblies so decide." ('Sudan
Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1995', United
States Department of State, Washington-DC, February 1996.)
