January 1997 Samuel
Aru Bol, a former deputy prime minister and past president
and secretary-general of the Sudan African National Union,
welcomes the political charters signed between the government
and the SSIM and other southern groups: "(T)he political
leaders of South Sudan, except John Garang and a few others,
want to negotiate with the government of the day to achieve
a peaceful and just solution to the conflict. Southerners
are not warmongers but peace-loving people." He stated
that the parties he represented within the Union of Sudan
African Parties (USAP): "represent the interest of
these peace-loving people of South Sudan and will join in
the subsequent peace talks stated in this political charter."
"What is the Solution
to the Southern Problem?", The Southern Sudan Bulletin,
Vol. 2, No.3, London, January 1997
January 1997 There
are reports of military incursions into Sudan from Ethiopia,
Eritrea and Uganda. There is considerable fighting in eastern
Sudan.
16 January 1997 The
Guardian reports that the Sudanese rebels have "tanks
and mortars" and Eritrean backing.
17 January 1997 The
Times of London reports that "[b]oth countries
have denied any involvement with the SPLA, but Eritrean
and Ethiopian officers have been seen commanding SPLA soldiers",
and quoted African diplomatic sources as saying there "is
no way that the SPLA are not being supported by the Eritreans
and Ethiopians". The Times also reports that
this aggression has the "enthusiastic backing of the
United States".
The Times (London),
17 January 1997
23 January 1997 Ethiopian
involvement was also clear. The Guardian quote a
senior SPLA officer as saying that "Ethiopia provides
us with a corridor" and that Ethiopia accommodated
the SPLA.
25 January 1997 The
South Sudan Independence Movement attack the SPLA's human
rights record. In a statement released in Washington-DC
they call upon the United States and its western allies
to "encourage reconciliation of Southern rebel groups
and abstain from endorsing the SPLM-SPLA as the 'main resistance'
movement." The SSIM also presented lists of southern
Sudanese political leaders that had been murdered by the
SPLA.
"SSIM Blasts Garang
as 'Bloody Dictator'", Executive Intelligence Review,
14 February 1997 at www.aboutsudan.com
February 1997 The
fighting in eastern Sudan stabilises.
21 February 1997 Dr
Ghazi Saleheddin Atabani, the Secretary-General of the National
Congress comments on the January incursions into Sudan by
Ethiopian and Eritrean forces: "Anthony Lake, the national
security adviser to the U.S. President, expounded the 'Sudan
policy' of the U.S. government in a public lecture in March
1995. He explicitly pointed out that the U.S. government
would harass the Sudan through some of its neighbors; Ethiopia,
Eritrea, and Uganda are the biggest recipients of U.S. and
European aid in sub-Saharan Africa. No wonder, therefore,
that they took it upon themselves to implement those vows
made by Mr Lake.The invasion was carried out at this particular
point in time to scuttle the internal peace process, which
had started to bear fruit."
"Foreign Invasion Designed
to Wreck Sudan's Internal Peace Initiative. Interview: Dr.
Ghazi Attabani", Executive Intelligence Review,
21 February 1997, at www.aboutsudan.com
30 March 1997 Following
a meeting in Asmara, Eritrea, a communiqué issued
by the leadership of the National Democratic Alliance states
that it will only accept initiatives toward peace within
the framework of IGAD. General Fathi Ahmed Ali, vice-president
of the NDA, further states that the NDA had re-affirmed
its goal of toppling the Sudanese government. SPLA representative
at the meeting. Magnetise Haled, declares that:
"The NDA is not only
an opposition force but an alternative to the present government.The
NDA will make all material and spiritual means useful to
make the popular uprising successful."
The Asmara meeting also
declares that the opposition would topple the Sudanese government
"within several months"; condemns countries supporting
the Sudanese government financially, militarily and politically;
agrees to step up civil disobedience abroad, threatens to
try the ruling government for violating the constitution,
for torture, for exporting terrorism, for ethnic cleansing
and for war crimes; and calls for diplomatic sanctions by
other countries in order to isolate Sudan. They also state
that they are hoping to step up military operations on the
eastern, western and southern fronts.
Richard Engel and Simon
Apiku, "Sudanese Rebels Find Unity in Asmara",
Middle East Times, 30 March 1997
April-May 1997 Commenting
on the military offensive earlier in 1997. the BBC observes
that: "It seemed that the northern and southern opposition
movements - operating under the umbrella National Democratic
Alliance - had launched a final campaign to bring down the
Islamic government of President Omer Hassan al-Bashir by
a strategy of direct military confrontation in the field
and civilian uprisings in the main cities, particularly
the capital, Khartoum."
"Under Fire",
Focus on Africa, BBC, London, April-June 1997
2 April 1997 Former
Sudanese Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi states that the Sudanese
opposition was working for the unity of Sudan but did not
rule out secession for the south. He says: "Any alternative
is better than war". He also assures Egypt that a potentially
independent south would respect the "international
nature" of the Nile.
"Sudan's Mahdi Does Not
Rule Out Secession for South", News Article by Reuters,
2 April 1997
21 April 1997 The
government signs the Khartoum Peace Agreement with the South
Sudan Independence Movement, led by Dr Riek Machar, the
Sudan People's Liberation Movement (Bahr al-Ghazal Group)
represented by Kerubino Bol Kuanyin, the Equatoria Defence
Force led by Dr Theophilus Ochang Loti, the South Sudan
Independents Group, Arok Thon Arok's SPLA-Bor group, and
the Union of Sudanese African Parties (USAP) represented
by Samuel Aru Bol (USAP was itself made up of seven political
parties - the Southern Sudan Political Association, the
People's Progressive Party, the Sudan African Congress,
the Sudan African People's Congress, the Southern Sudan
Federal Party, the Sudan African National Union and the
Sudan National Party). The agreement provides for a free
and fair, internationally-supervised, referendum in southern
Sudan to determine whether the people of the south desire
independence or federation. The south would continue to
be exempt from sharia law.
The agreement also guarantees
freedom of movement, assembly, organisation, speech and
press, and provides for an equitable representation of southerners
at all levels within Sudan. It further provides for the
formation of a 25-member Southern Coordination Council,
to include a president, 14 ministers and the ten southern
state governors, to serve as a southern government until
the referendum, which was to be held in four years time
given a situation of peace. It is also agreed that there
will be an equitable sharing of national resources between
the different regions of Sudan, with priority given to the
reconstruction of the south.
23 April 1997 NDA
Chairman and DUP leader Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, the
chairman of the National Democratic Alliance, the umbrella
group of northern and southern opposition groups, rejects
the provision of a referendum on self-determination for
southern Sudan entrenched in the Khartoum Peace Agreement.
He states: "We shall take drastic measures to stop
the separatists from splitting up our country."
The SSIM's spokesman for
information, Paul Mabior, speaking in London, states that:
"The Sudanese, both from the north and south, are fed
up with war and have now decided to resolve their conflict
through a referendum."
"Sudan: Exiled Opposition
Rejects This Week's Peace Pact", News Article by World
News IPS, 23 April 1997
21 May 1997 The
government of Sudan releases 80 political prisoners and
states that they had been released to pave the way for cooperation
between the government and the opposition. The Minister
of Justice, Abdel Basit Sabdarat, states: "Sudan has
no more political prisoners, all the detainees have been
freed. The opposition should grip such an opportunity.The
government is prepared to hold peaceful negotiations and
dialogue."
The Khartoum government
also states that it is preparing to draft a permanent constitution
and wishes to see as many politicians as possible participating
in the process.
"Sudan Frees Prisoners
and Calls for Peace", Electronic Mail and Guardian,
(Johannesburg), 21 May 1997
31 May 1997 The
leader of the South Sudan Independence Movement, Dr Riek
Machar, speaking at the end of the OAU Council of Ministers
meeting, states that given the Khartoum Peace Agreement
of 21 April signed between rebels and the government of
Sudan, John Garang no longer had a reason to continue fighting.
Machar states that the agreement was a breakthrough and
realised the dreams of southern Sudanese who had been fighting
since 1955 for their rights. He states that the Khartoum
Agreement "is the progressive way forward. The agreement
is comprehensive enough to accommodate all views.whatever
they are".
"Former Guerrilla Says
Garang Has No Reason to Continue Sudan War", News Article
by PANA, 31 May 1997; "Ex-Ally Says Garang Cannot Win
Sudanese War", News Article by Reuters, 30 May 1997
June 1997 In
an interview with the Swiss newspaper Neue Zurcher Zeitung
SPLA leader John Garang declares that: "We have shown
that the myth of the NIF's invincibility was a balloon,
and we've now punctured it . We have intensified the war
in the South...I wouldn't want to predict how many days,
weeks or months it will be until the regime falls. I'm no
prophet. But it will be sooner rather than later, because
the regime is no longer capable of reversing the situation."
"'Our Goal Is to Topple
the Khartoum Regime': An Interview with John Garang, Head
of the Sudan People's Liberation Army", NZZ Background,
Neue Zurcher Zeitung, June 1997
9 July 1997
SPLA leader John Garang states that his forces were
escalating their activities and were circling Juba. Garang
also rejects the offer of a face-to-face meeting with President
Bashir.
"Sudan Rebel Leader
Eyes Juba, Rejects Talks", News Article by ArabicNews.com,
9 July 1997
9 July 1997 At
the IGAD heads-of-state summit meeting, Sudanese President
al-Bashir states that Sudan accepts the IGAD 'Declaration
of Principles' as the basis for a negotiated end to the
Sudanese conflict. The five leaders at the IGAD talks also
issue a statement saying:
"The summit welcomed
the acceptance by the government of Sudan of the declaration
of principles as the basis for discussions and negotiations.
The summit considered this development a major breakthrough
in the peace initiative. This will enable the parties to
the conflict to freely discuss and negotiate on all the
points enshrined in the declaration of principles. The summit
requests the chairman of the IGAD peace initiative to take
the necessary measures aimed at a speedy resumption of the
negotiations."
"Bashir Accepts Framework
for Peace Talks", News Article by Reuters, 9 July 1997
23 July 1997 The
April Khartoum Peace Agreement passes into law as the 14th
constitutional amendment.
7 August 1997 The
Southern Coordination Council is formed. Dr Riek Machar
is appointed president of the Council.
"Sudanese President
Appoints Head of Southern [Council]", News Article
by XINHUA, 7 August 1997
12 August 1997 Sudanese
President Omer al-Bashir, speaking at a press conference
following talks with President Nelson Mandela, calls for
a cease-fire in the Sudanese civil war. He states: "We
believe that the war should come to an end. In this respect
we have requested for a ceasefire with the faction of Dr
John Garang."
"Bashir Calls for Ceasefire
With Rebels", News Article by Reuters, 12 August 1997
16 August 1997 Responding
to Sudanese President Omer al-Bashir's call for a cease-fire
Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, head of the National Democratic
Alliance, rejects bilateral talks with the Sudanese government.
He states: "The view of the NDA . is that bilateral
negotiations with the regime will not achieve peace in Sudan."
"Sudan Opposition Head
Rejects Talks With Khartoum", News Article by Reuters,
16 August 1997
18 August 1997 Africa
Confidential Sudan specialist Gill Lusk states: "The
opposition expects to overthrow the government by the end
of the year or the first half of next year. Previously cautious
Western officials agree. It's a matter of time."
Newsweek,
18 August 1997, p.18.
21 August 1997 The
SPLA rejects Nelson Mandela's offers to mediate directly
between the Sudanese government and the rebels. A statement
by SPLA spokesman John Luk declares that the SPLA is not
seeking any other form of mediation. He states: "The
SPLA remains committed to the IGAD peace process under President
Daniel Arap Moi and will not seek another alternative forum."
Former SPLA commander Riek
Machar - who had signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese
Government in April 1997 - states that during a visit to
South Africa he and his group of 6 former rebel factions
would continue to appeal to the SPLA to join the peace process.
"Why Sudan's Rebels
Snubbed Mandela", Electronic Mail and Guardian
(Johannesburg), 25 August 1997
22 August 1997 Sudanese
President Omer al-Bashir, following his meeting with President
Mandela, states: "We support the call of South African
President Nelson Mandela for a ceasefire with the SPLA."
"Sudanese and the National
Cake", News Article by ArabicNews.com, 22 August 1997
29 August 1997 SPLA
leader John Garang refuses to meet Sudanese President Omer
al-Bashir or attend the joint talks hosted by President
Mandela between Bashir and Ugandan President Museveni. Garang
states: "Of course the war goes on.we are preparing
ourselves to defend our gains as well as to extend them."
"Rebel Leader Garang
Says 'War Goes On'", News Article by Reuters, 29 August
1979
2 September 1997 President
Frederick Chiluba of Zambia, following a meeting with President
Bashir, stated that his government wanted to join the search
for peace in Sudan: "We have seen your efforts to try
and establish peace and we commend you for them."
17 September 1997 The
federally-funded US Institute of Peace holds a meeting on
"Religion, Nationalism and Peace in Sudan". John
Prendergast of the National Security Council outlines Washington's
policy toward Sudan. He describes Sudan as "the principle
threat to US national security interests on the Continent
today". He further states:
"The US Government
strongly supports IGADD as the only viable interlocutor
for peace talks on Sudan at this time. We support the IGADD
declaration of principles as the basis for such talks. We
do not view the April peace agreement signed between the
government of Sudan and the splinter rebel southern factions
as a viable alternative to peace in Sudan. We have actively
countered the government of Sudan's efforts to utilise other
mediators and the April peace agreement as vehicles to divide
international support for IGADD."
"Meeting on Religion,
Nationalism and Peace in Sudan", United States Institute
of Peace, Washington, DC, 17 September 1997; http://www.usip.org/research/rehr/sudanconf/panel6.html
20 September 1997 The
government and Dr Lam Akol, the leader of the SPLA-United
rebel faction sign the 'Fashoda Peace Agreement'. The agreement
is facilitated by the Reth of the Shilluk, and while agreeing
some amendments to it, the SPLA-United becomes a further
signatory to the April 1997 Sudan Peace Agreement.
25 September 1997 Commenting
on the Clinton Administration's US$20 million grant in military
aid to Eritrea, Ethiopia and Uganda former United States
President Jimmy Carter states that it was "a tacit
demonstration of support for the overthrow of the Khartoum
government". He also believed that this behaviour by
Washington had a negative effect on the SPLA's interest
in negotiating a political settlement: "I think Garang
now feels he doesn't need to negotiate because he anticipates
a victory brought about by increasing support from his immediate
neighbors, and also from the United States and indirectly
from other countries."
'Ex-President Opposes Policy
of Aiding Khartoum's Foes', The Washington Times,
25 September 1997.
October 1997 President
al-Bashir announces the creation of a 377-member commission
to draft a new constitution.
7 October 1997 Commenting
on the Clinton Administration's Sudan policy, former American
President Carter observes "If the United States would
be reasonably objective in Sudan, I think that we at the
Carter Center and the Africans who live in the area could
bring peace to Sudan. But the United States government has
a policy of trying to overthrow the government in Sudan.
So whenever there's a peace initiative, unfortunately our
government puts up whatever obstruction it can."
'CARE Seeks Political Fix
in Sudan', Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 7 October
1999.
November 1997 American
journalist Bill Berkeley, in an in-depth study of the war
in southern Sudan, published in The New York Times Magazine,
states: "Across the south in its heyday the SPLA behaved
like an occupying army. Civilians remain the main military
targets. All factions [of the SPLA] seek to destroy communities
presumed to be supporting their opponents. In far-flung
scorched-earth sweeps, minimally trained, totally illiterate,
heavily armed fighters torch villages, steal the livestock
and food, plant land mines, conscript the young men and
boys and rape the women and girls. Garang's explicit strategy
was to render south Sudan ungovernable, and in that he succeeded.
The south today is not only ungovernable but virtually uninhabitable."
Garang states that: "Of
course, we are not trying to achieve a military victory.
We cannot win this war." Berkeley observes of the SPLA
that it is "at once a genuine liberation movement and
a loose confederation of ethnically based criminal gangs"
and that "[I]ts character was shaped by its principal
backer, the former Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam,
and by Mengistu's backer, the Soviet Union". Berkeley
also observes that "few doubt that the Clinton Administration
has had a hand in Garang's revival".
Bill Berkeley, 'The Longest War In The World',
The New York Times Magazine, November 1997
1-7 November 1997 The
fifth round of Intergovernmental Authority on Development
peace talks between the government and SPLA are held in
Nairobi. It is the first meeting since the signing of the
Khartoum Peace Agreement, and the government's offer of
an internationally supervised referendum on southern self-determination.
In discussions about a referendum, the SPLA present a map
showing the areas it demands should exercise self-determination.
These areas include not only the Nuba mountains and Ingessana
Hills, but several other areas in Darfur, Kordofan, White
Nile and Blue Nile. The government's offer was to have been
for southern Sudan according to the 1956 boundaries. The
talks stall on this issue.
2 November 1997 The
European Union reiterates its support for peace talks aimed
at settling the Sudanese civil war. It states that it hoped
the present round of peace talks will stop the killing and
let international aid flow.
3 November 1997 President
Clinton signed executive order 13067, under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703 et seq)
and the National Emergencies Act (50 USC 1641 c), which
imposed comprehensive trade and economic sanctions against
Sudan. The order declared "that the policies of Sudan
constitute an extraordinary and unusual threat to the national
security and foreign policy of the United States".
'The U.S. Imposes New Sanctions
on Sudan', Thomson Financial Publishing,
http://www.tfp.com/news/USSudan.htm,
4 November 1997.
29 November 1997 SPLA
leader John Garang, in a visit to Cairo to brief Egyptian
officials on the peace talks in Kenya, states that: "We
are prepared as a matter of principle to talk with the government
of the day in Khartoum." He also states that he is
committed to preserving the unity of Sudan.
"SPLA Committed to
Sudan Unity", News Article by ArabicNews.com, 29 November
1997
6 December 1997 The
Sudanese foreign minister, Ali Osman Taha, accuses SPLA
leader John Garang of not being interested in a peaceful
solution to the conflict. He states that the last round
of peace talks had achieved little, and that the government
would continue to implement the peace accord it had signed
in April with other rebel groups.
"Sudan Says Garang
Not Interested in Peace", News Article by BBC News,
6 December 1997
12 December 1997 John
Garang, commenting on the November round of peace talks
in Nairobi, states that: "We intended not to reach
an agreement with the NIF. This is what we did and we succeeded
in it because we did not reach an agreement."
Summary of World Broadcasts,
BBC, 15 December 1997
9 January 1998 Umma
Party leader Sadiq al-Mahdi stated that he saw change in
the government's position: "There is a new political
atmosphere about national dialogue. I recognize that the
language of the Sudanese government has changed."
"New Developments in
Sudan: Alsadig Almahdi", News Article by ArabicNews.com,
13 January 1998.
19-20 January 1998 The
first meeting of the Joint IGAD Partners Forum at ministerial
level is held in Rome. In its Final Declaration the Forum
declares regarding Sudan:
"Participants welcomed
the resumption of the negotiating process between the Government
of Sudan and the Southern Parties which took place in Nairobi
in October-November 1997, under Kenyan chairmanship. They
strongly appealed to the Parties concerned to fully engage
in the next stage of the reconciliation process promoted
by IGAD in order to bring to an end soon the Sudanese conflict.[Participants]
declared their readiness to support with all possible means
the 'shuttle diplomacy' under the auspices of the Kenyan
chairmanship in preparation of the next session of the peace
talks to be held in Nairobi in April 1998."
Final Declaration, First
Ministerial Meeting of the Joint IGAD Partners Forum, Rome,
19-20 January 1998, at http://www.estreri.it/archivi/documenti/do190198.htm
28-29 January 1998 Several
thousand SPLA insurgents, led by Kerubino Bol Kuanyin, attack
Wau. There is fierce fighting in the north-eastern and southern
part of Wau. After 48-hours of fighting the rebels retreat.
31 January 1998 The
Sudanese foreign minister calls on the SPLA to offer concessions
and states that the government was ready to offer guarantees
to build confidence between the two sides to reach a settlement.
3 February 1998 A
Sudanese army spokesman stated that Eritrea had shelled
border areas in eastern Sudan. Areas around Kassala were
shelled twice in three days.
"Military Confrontation
Erupts Between Sudan and Eritrea", News Article by
ArabicNews.com, 3 February 1998.
10 February 1998 The
Sudanese government states that heavy artillery shelling
from inside Ethiopia had accompanied rebel attacks in the
al-Kadaref province of Sudan, near the Sudanese-Ethiopian
border.
12 February 1998 The
First Vice-President, Lieutenant-General al-Zubeir Mohammed
Salih and a number of other officials die when their airplane
crashes on landing at Nasir in Upper Nile. SPLA spokesman
Justin Yaac claimed that SPLA forces had shot down the plane
as it was passing through "an area we control".
'Sudan rebels say they downed
vice-president's plane', News Article by Reuters, 12 February
1998
13 February 1998 As
more information emerges about the crash which resulted
in the death of the first vice-president and other officials,
which was the result of poor visibility during landing,
the SPLA withdraw its claim to have shot his plane down.
SPLA spokesman John Luk stated that they had no forces in
the area in southern Sudan where the crash occurred.
'Sudan rebels withdraw plane
crash claim', News Article by Reuters, 13 February 1998
19 February 1998 NDA
chairman, and DUP leader, Mohammed Osman al-Mirghani, in
meetings with the Egyptian government, states that peace
can only be achieved in Sudan through talks with the Sudanese
government and opposition groups.
"Peace Will Not be
Achieved in Sudan Except Through Talks", News Article
by ArabicNews.com, 19 February 1998
22 February 1998 Interviewed
in Khartoum, the president of the Southern Coordinating
Council, Dr Riek Machar, discussed the evolution of the
peace process in the light of the return to Khartoum of
several northern opposition leaders: "[T]here are new
alliances taking place in the country. The final result
would be that the attempt for reconciliation with the northern
political parties will be accelerated, whatever their stand
will be. Pluralism, freedom of speech, freedom of political
organisation are coming. The moves towards peace have been
consolidated. Definitely, they will have to come to terms
with the government. In it, the loser will be John Garang,
because the talk of the overthrow of the government, will
not be there with the northern political parties, if they
get the guarantees; politically, they will operate. They
will have no reason to continue holding arms and fighting
the government. Garang will be faced with the choice, to
come to peace. After all, he has no reason to continue the
war, because if he is fighting for the federal system, this
is under implementation; if he is fighting for self-rule
in the South, there is a special status for the South during
the interim period. If he is fighting for the right to self-determination,
it shall be exercised through a referendum. He has no political
agenda."
"Why Southern Leaders
Want to End the War. Interview: Dr Riek Machar", Executive
Intelligence Review, 13 March 1998, at
www.aboutsudan.com
